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Abstract 
This thesis aims to explore the disconnect between calls for safe zones as a tool of 
humanitarian intervention, and the dark history of safe zone failure. This thesis begins with a 
brief discussion of current calls for safe zones in Syria, and how a proper theoretical framework 
and historical understanding are needed to discuss whether or not safe zones can be successfully 
implemented in Syria. The following literature review discusses not only prominent academic 
arguments and the history of humanitarian intervention, but it suggests a framework for 
deconstructing case studies. This framework looks first at the interests of an intervening actor. 
The level of interest of that actor directly informs its willingness to overcome the challenges of 
safe zone implementation. The challenges of safe zone implementation are both practical and 
existential. If an actor’s interest in a given crisis is not great enough to make it willing to 
overcome these practical and existential challenges, or the actor is willing to overcome them but 
lacks the ability to do so, the safe zone will fail. In most cases of failed safe zones, moral hazard 
plays a role. Moral hazard can be evident in either the intervening actor’s decisions or the 
decisions of the international community to support or not support the intervention. This thesis 
then deconstructs three historical cases of safe zones with this method: Srebrenica in Bosnia, 
Operation Provide Comfort in Iraqi Kurdistan, and Operation Turquoise in Rwanda. Following 
these three case studies, this paper discusses safe zones in Syria with the help of this method and 
the broad historical understanding of safe zones established through the case studies. This thesis 
concludes with a discussion of how the analysis and available historical cases show that safe 
zones are dangerous tools of humanitarian intervention and should not be undertaken without 
adequate levels of interest and willingness to address challenges.  
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 6 
Introduction 
 
Since its beginning in 2011, the civil war in Syria has claimed 400,000 lives at a 
minimum.1  The conflict is marked by some of the most horrendous images of modern times; 
cities razed to the ground, refugees braving open oceans to find safety, and citizens murdered by 
chemical weapons. Even as it seems the war might be coming to an end, the final rebel 
stronghold at Idlib where an estimated three million civilians have fled stands between Assad 
and victory.2  In September of 2018, Turkish and Russian forces reached an agreement to 
establish Idlib as a demilitarized zone where “Russian forces… patrol the edge of the rebel-held 
province while the Turkish army… [operates] in the demilitarized zone.”3 The demilitarized 
zone and ceasefire in Idlib, however, are beginning to fray as Turkey flounders in achieving its 
promises of vacating rebel groups from the city. Facing this tenuous situation, with the lives of 
millions of civilians potentially hanging in the balance, safe zones have come up as a possible 
solution to the situation.  
  Throughout the entirety of the conflict, not just in these last few months, discussion of 
safe zones has been prevalent. During the second presidential debate between Hillary Clinton 
and Donald Trump in October 2016, the moderator asked, “If you were president, what would 
you do about Syria and the humanitarian crisis in Aleppo?4” Clinton responded, “Well, the 
situation in Syria is catastrophic… So I, when I was Secretary of State, I advocated and I 
                                                 
1 Megan Specia, “How Syria’s Death Toll Is Lost in the Fog of War,” New York Times, April 13, 2018, 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/13/world/middleeast/syria-death-toll.html. 
2 Jeremy Bowen, “Sense of an ending for Syria’s war on Idlib front line,” BBC News, October 9, 2018, 
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-45796263. 
3 “Turkey and Russia hold joint patrols in Syria’s Idlib,” Aljazeera, March 8, 2019, 
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/03/turkey-russia-hold-joint-patrols-syria-idlib-190308113441646.html. 
4 “US Debate: Clinton and Trump Clash Over Syrian War,” Aljazeera, October 10, 2016,  
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/10/debate-clinton-trump-clash-syrian-war-161010093723691.html  
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advocate today, a no-fly zone and safe zones.5”  This seemingly simple and reasonable 
suggestion contains more complexity and history than is immediately evident in Clinton’s 
remarks. Safe zones are, in the historical record, one of the most fraught tools of humanitarian 
intervention available. They are widely-called for and generally accepted as positive by the 
international community, despite their complicated track record.     
Safe zones cannot and should not be discussed outside of a theoretical and historical 
framework. Discussion of them as a tool is a uniquely visceral subject; there is so much surface 
appeal, and at a glance, the idea of them is deceptively clear. The thought of safe zones evokes 
the idea of a light at the end of a tunnel. This notion, however, is false. Layers of tragedy, 
misuse, and insurmountable complexity shroud the history of safe zones. Never once have safe 
zones been implemented as effortlessly or beneficially as international leaders appear to suggest. 
The failure of the UN safe zone at Srebrenica, for example, remains the worst atrocity committed 
on European soil since the end of WWII.  Yet Clinton called for the implementation of safe 
zones in Syria, and leaders across the globe echoed her suggestion, leaving her with strange 
bedfellows in this suggested policy.  
Senator Marco Rubio penned an article for Foreign Policy arguing that “we should also 
work with our allies, particularly with neighboring states such as Jordan and Turkey, to set up 
safe zones in border regions of Syria.”6 The Turkish government also voiced support for the 
creation of safe zones in Syria, bolstered by similar comments from the former French President, 
Francois Hollande, and the UK’s current Foreign Secretary.7 Merkel joined the group of 
                                                 
5 Ibid.  
6 Marco Rubio, “It’s Not Too Late to Save Iraq and Syria,” Foreign Policy, August 25, 2015, 
https://foreignpolicy.com/2015/08/25/its-not-too-late-to-save-iraq-and-syria-marco-rubuio/. 
7 Dion Nissenbaum, Ayla Albayrak, and Nour Malas, “World News: U.S. Sends Mixed Signals on Syria Safe Zone -
-- Turkey’s Push for Buffer Area for Refugees Along Syrian Border is Backed by France; Americans Offer Varied 
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individuals in favor of implementing safe zones, vocally supporting the creation of ‘humanitarian 
harbors’ on the Syrian side of the Turkish-Syrian border.8 Robert Gates, Obama’s former 
Secretary of Defense, even suggested that safe zones were the only tool available to ameliorate 
the humanitarian disaster created by the civil war.9   
President Trump has also shown shifting views on the subject.  In a 2015 campaign rally, 
he stated, “in Syria, take a big swatch of land… What I'd like is build a safe zone, it’s here, build 
a big beautiful safe zone.”10 He reaffirmed this stance two years later, saying in an interview with 
NBC that he will, “absolutely do safe zones in Syria for the people.”11 The Washington Post 
leaked an early draft of Executive Order 13769 that included the instruction, “the Secretary of 
State, in conjunction with the Secretary of Defense, is directed within 90 days of the date of this 
order to produce a plan to provide safe areas in Syria.”12 The stipulation was removed from the 
final version of the order, however, and over two years into Trump’s presidency, no safe zones 
have been established.  
Trump was not alone in his period of reluctance to implement safe zones in Syria. Two 
prominent parties also oppose them: former UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Zeid 
Ra'ad Al Hussein, and Syrian rebel leaders. In a February 2018 address, Al Hussein warned that 
“the term 'de-escalation area' [was] becoming all too reminiscent of the so-called ‘safe areas’ in 
                                                 
Messages, “The Wall Street Journal, October 9, 2014, https://search-proquest-
com.ccl.idm.oclc.org/docview/1609266925?accountid=10141.   
8 Ercan Gurses and Andreas Rinke, “Germany seeking ‘safe zones’ in Syria to shelter refugees,” Reuters, April 23, 
2016, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-europe-migrants-turkey-germany-idUSKCN0XK0BS. 
9 Kristina Wong, “McCain backs Clinton’s call for a no-fly zone in Syria,” The Hill, October 10, 2015,  
http://thehill.com/policy/defense/257406-mccain-backs-clintons-call-for-a-no-fly-zone-in-syria. 
10 Ali Vitali, “Donald Trump: Gove Syrian Refugees ‘Swatch of Land’ for Safe Zone,” NBC News, November 16, 
2015, https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/2016-election/trump-give-syrian-refugees-swatch-land-safe-zone-n464586. 
11Julia Edwards Ainsley and Matt Spetalnick, “Trump says he will order ‘safe zones’ for Syria,” Reuters, January 
25, 2017, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trump-syria-safezones-idUSKBN1592O8.  
12“Read the draft of executive order on immigration and refugees,” The Washington Post, 
https://apps.washingtonpost.com/g/documents/world/read-the-draft-of-the-executive-order-on-immigration-and-
refugees/2289/.  
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Bosnia.”13 Al Hussein’s calls for an end to de-escalation zones are founded in two reasons. The 
first is the historical precedent of their failure, and the second is their use as a band-aid that 
allows the international community to channel efforts into addressing a symptom of the conflict, 
and not its cause.14  For their part, Syrian rebel leaders rejected a May 2017 Russian plan to 
implement safe zones on grounds that it was, “a threat to the country’s territorial integrity.”15  
  There is a unique and uniquely tangled web of motivations and beliefs that dictate the 
positions of everyone involved in the question of safe zones in Syria. What scenario could place 
Hillary Clinton, Vladimir Putin, Marco Rubio, and Angela Merkel together in support of a 
proposition opposed by a former UN High Commissioner for Human Rights? There are many 
answers to this question, and they lie in the varied motivations for, and complexities of, these 
widespread calls for safe zones. There is, of course, extensive international desire to offer 
humanitarian aid to civilians in conflict zones, but countries also have vested interests in calling 
for safe zones. Additionally, with the implementation of safe zones, there are questions 
surrounding which actor could create and enforce them, and how it would do so, which 
inevitably become political questions. Through this politicization, safe zones become even more 
complicated and nuanced.  
The question of safe zones in Syria is ultimately a quagmire. To break down this puzzle 
in a productive way that could inform a policy recommendation for rendering humanitarian aid 
in Syria, a method to evaluate case studies of safe zones is necessary. Theoretical material 
regarding safe zones, humanitarian intervention, and relevant international law on the subject are 
                                                 
13 “UN rights chief urges international action as violence soars in Syria,” United Nations Human Rights: Office of 
the High Commissioner, February 10, 2018, 
https://www.ohchr.org/en/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=22647. 
14 Ibid.  
15 Dmitry Solovyov, “Syrian rebels reject Russia’s proposal for safe zones,” Reuters, May 4, 2017,  
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-safezones-opposition-idUSKBN1801TF. 
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not sufficient in informing appropriate courses of action in Syria. This insufficiency is due to the 
fact that no two historical examples of safe zones are the same; they are not implemented by 
similar actors, they do not take analogous forms, they are not established during comparable 
conflicts, they do not face similar problems, and they do not have similar outcomes. In order to 
properly understand safe zones, and both the problems they face and their historical strengths 
and downfalls, case studies provide a more effective method than theoretical models and 
scholarly material alone. This thesis does not seek to define safe zones or compare them exactly 
to one another, rather it seeks to apply a set method of analysis to four case studies, and 
ultimately, from this analysis, draw conclusions about the viability of safe zones as a policy tool.   
This thesis is divided into three main sections. A literature review follows this 
introduction, exploring the relevant writing on the subject and establishing a basic understanding 
of the history of humanitarian intervention and its difficulties. The literature review concludes by 
proposing a method for analyzing case studies so they can be considered systematically and with 
a logical progression. The method analyzes the interests of various actors involved in the 
creation of a specific safe zone. An actor’s level of interest directly informs its willingness to 
overcome the challenges of implementing a safe zone, which are necessarily extensive. Notably, 
a willingness to execute a safe zone does not inherently mean that the actor has the ability to do 
so. Moral hazard additionally plays a role in interventions where there is a mismatch between 
interest, willingness, and practical challenges. This moral hazard can appeal to both the 
intervening actor and the international community.  
Once this method is established, this paper will consider three case studies: Srebrenica in 
Bosnia, Operation Provide Comfort in Iraqi Kurdistan, and Operation Turquoise in Rwanda. 
These three cases have been chosen specifically because they represent unique and varied 
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intersections of interest, will, ability, and outcome. They additionally comprise a broad 
geographical area and three separate modes of implementation. Peacekeepers implemented the 
safe area in Bosnia, the U.S. military in concert with a multinational coalition undertook the safe 
zone in northern Iraq, and France carried out its humanitarian intervention in Rwanda alone. 
These case studies will be discussed historically, and then analyzed through the established 
method. Each case study will provide different insights into safe zones and offer unique 
conclusions regarding the legitimacy and efficacy of safe zones as a tool of humanitarian 
intervention. Following the exploration of each of these cases, this thesis will consider the case 
of Syria and the current calls for safe zones in the northwestern part of the country. The 
conclusions from the other case studies will inform this consideration of the actors involved in 
the Syrian civil war, their interests, and their will to overcome specific barriers. The chapter will 
ultimately conclude whether or not safe zones could be successful in Syria.   
The lessons learned from these four scenarios will then be extrapolated into a larger 
discussion regarding the viability of safe zones in future conflict.  This discussion will consider 
the patterns of interest and willingness to overcome obstacles apparent in each of these cases, 
and how those considerations inform the success or failure of safe zones. The conclusion will 
ultimately comment on whether or not these inherent relationships between interest and will, and 
will and success, should inform the continued use of safe zones, or if the cases and evidence 
explored point to the opposite conclusion.  
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Literature Review 
 
In Safety Zones and International Protection: A Dark Grey Area, Karin Landgren wrote of 
the 20th century:  
It is a truism to note that the waging of war has changed: at the beginning of this
 century, 90% of war casualties were military; now, 90% are civilians. Following the end 
of the Cold War, conflicts have been overwhelmingly internal and have often had as their 
explicit objective the displacement or elimination of rival ethnic or communal groups. The 
belligerents appear unfamiliar with or not interested in international humanitarian law, and 
less susceptible to international condemnation. They may see little relevance in the 
distinction between civilians and combatants.16 
 
Landgren is plainly asserting that war used to kill soldiers, but now conflict kills civilians. UNICEF 
suggests that this shift is due to a change in the structure of war; where conflict used to be between 
two professional armies, now wars are often a, “[grinding struggle] between military and civilians 
in the same country, or between hostile groups of armed civilians. More and more wars are 
essentially low-intensity internal conflicts, and they are lasting longer.”17 It is additionally 
important to note that the seeds for this shift in the groups that are mainly harmed by war began in 
the early 20th century. Civilians were harmed en masse during World War One, and World War 
Two was defined by Nazis indiscriminately targeting Russian and Eastern Europe civilians, in 
addition to U.S. and allied forces firebombing innocents in Japan and razing Dresden to the ground. 
Russia also committed widespread, brutal, and systematic rape against German women as a 
reprisal for Nazi military actions.   
The international community has not robustly responded to this shift in the composition 
of conflict. The international community established the International Criminal Court (ICC) and 
                                                 
16 Karin Landgren, “Safety Zones and International Protection: A Dark Grey Area,” International Journal of 
Refugee Law 7, no. 3 (September 1995): 437.  
17 Ibid.  
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has pursued a number of war tribunals to uphold the Geneva Conventions, which set out the 
rights of individuals in wartime. These two moves attempted to prosecute war crimes in hopes of 
shifting the nature of war back to a system less harmful to innocents in conflict zones.18 
However, the effects of these two institutions have been minimal, as the ICC and war tribunals 
have limited reach and power. As a result, the international community has chosen to respond to 
these changes in warfare primarily by declaring humanitarian intervention a duty of the 
international community and its organizations. In other words, the international community has 
chosen to institutionalize addressing the symptom of the problem, not its cause.   
Brendan Simms and D.J.B. Trim in Humanitarian Intervention: A History define 
humanitarian intervention as, “action by governments (or, more rarely, by organizations) to 
prevent or to stop governments, organizations, or factions, in a foreign state from violently 
oppressing, persecuting, or otherwise abusing the human rights of people within that state.”19 
This definition provides an understanding of the basic idea of humanitarian intervention, but it is 
important to note that the individuals studying, defining, and discussing humanitarian 
intervention span fields from ethics to war studies. They are additionally trying to explain a 
phenomenon that can be occasionally difficult to separate from, “coercive diplomacy… armed 
participation in foreign civil wars, revolts, revolutions, and insurgencies.”20 In defining, 
discussing, and constraining humanitarian intervention, scholars and politicians alike have 
struggled with the fact that humanitarian intervention necessarily abrogates national sovereignty 
and picks sides within a conflict.  
                                                 
18 Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Examples (New York: Basic Books, 
2015), 154. 
19 Brendan Simms and D.J.B. Trim, Humanitarian Intervention: A History (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
2011), 1.  
20 Simms, Humanitarian Intervention, 2. 
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As conflict-related humanitarian crises mounted in the 20th century, the international 
community was faced with a growing need to create an international legal framework to justify 
and control humanitarian intervention, and it tackled the obstacle of sovereignty first. The Treaty 
of Westphalia marked the end of the Thirty Years’ War and ushered in an international shift from 
feudal principalities to sovereign states, founding the notion of territorial sovereignty.21 This 
concept is defined as, “the recognition by internal and external actors that the state has the 
exclusive authority to intervene coercively in activities within its territory.”22 Seyom Brown, a 
prominent scholar on the subject, argues that this unique shift not only led to the creation of 
nation-states but additionally fostered a sense of ‘Westphalian principles’ within them.23 Brown 
considers Westphalian principles to be the normative core of international law; namely, derived 
from this notion of inviolable sovereignty, it is largely understood in the international community 
that countries shall not interfere with each other’s domestic affairs.24   
The international community hurdled this obstacle by creating international legal 
justifications for abrogating the sovereignty of states at certain times. Plainly put, “The 
perpetration of tyranny is not simply an obvious assault on the dignity of persons: it is a betrayal 
of the very purpose for which the government exists.”25 A government surrenders its right to 
sovereignty when it fails to fulfill, or chooses not to fulfill, its most basic responsibility of 
protecting the citizens who live under it. After creating this legal argument to justify 
                                                 
21 Jason Farr, “The Westphalia Legacy and the Modern Nation-State,” International Social Science Review 80, no. 
3/4 (2005): 156, https://www.jstor.org/stable/41887235.  
22 Janice E. Thomson, “State Sovereignty in International Relations: Bridging the Gap between Theory and 
Empirical Research,” International Studies Quarterly 39, no. 2 (June 1995): 219, 
https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/2600847.pdf 
23Andreas Osiander, “Sovereignty, International Relations, and the Westphalia Myth,” International Organization, 
55, no. 2 (Spring 2001): 261, https://doi.org/10.1162/00208180151140577. 
24 Ibid.  
25 Fernando R. Téson, “The Ethics of Humanitarian Intervention,” in Humanitarian Intervention: Ethical, Legal, and 
Political Dilemmas, ed. J.L. Holzgrefe and Robert O. Keohane (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003): 96. 
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humanitarian intervention, the international community set about adopting a series of norms to 
govern the actualization of it. In Humanitarian Intervention: Ethical, Legal, and Political 
Dilemmas, Fernando Téson argues that humanitarian intervention is only legitimate when it 
follows certain principles. Those principles include, “proportional… use… of military force, 
undertaken in principle by a liberal government or alliance, aimed at ending tyranny or anarchy, 
[and] welcomed by the victims.26” 
 However, the fact remained that the international community did not require 
organizations or individual actors to intervene in humanitarian crises. Rather, it had created a 
complex framework to justify intervention in the face of certain atrocities. Faced with an 
increasing number of unaddressed humanitarian crises at odds with the robust international and 
academic framework for humanitarian intervention, the UN created the doctrine of 
Responsibility to Protect (R2P).  R2P was originally suggested in 2001 by the International 
Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS), a commission populated mainly by 
countries from the UN General Assembly.27 R2P declares that upholding the rights the 
international community has granted to individuals constitutes a duty for international 
organizations and independent actors.28 Essentially, the international community created R2P as 
an attempt to institutionalize the requirement of intervention in qualifying humanitarian crises.  
The UN made a concerted effort to increase intervention in the years following the 
adoption of R2P, including the implementation of a peacekeeping mission in Darfur to address 
the genocide.29 However, the UN did not respond to any number of other humanitarian crises (an 
                                                 
26 Téson, “Ethics,” 94. 
27 Todd Burkhardt, Just War and Human Rights: Fighting with Right Intention (Albany, New York: State University 
of New York Press, 2017), 87. 
28 Burkhardt, Just War, 8. 
29 “The Dilemma of Humanitarian Intervention,” Council on Foreign Relations, last modified June 12, 2013, 
https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/dilemma-humanitarian-intervention. 
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action commonly referred to as nonintervention) ranging from a devastating cyclone in Burma in 
2008 to Desmond Tutu’s call for a nonmilitary intervention in Zimbabwe.30 R2P additionally 
provided France with appropriate justification to become involved in conflicts in Mali, which, at 
best, was problematic given France’s position as Mali’s former colonizer.31 Noting French 
involvement in Mali is important because it shows how, not only was R2P not fully actualized, 
but it even gave actors a cover to pursue advantageous policy options that may otherwise have 
been viewed unfavorably by the international community.  
Additionally, a number of UN interventions that were undertaken in good faith proved 
less than successful.32 For example, in 2011, the United Nations Security Council passed 
Resolution 1973 to address the deteriorating situation in Libya. The Resolution called for an 
immediate ceasefire and permitted the use of ‘all means necessary’ to protect citizens.33 A 
coalition led by NATO began a military intervention in mid-March that lasted until Gaddafi’s 
death in October.  Following the end of the fighting, the UN established the United Nations 
Support Mission in Libya to help the transitional government, but reconstruction efforts have 
proven largely unsuccessful. The UN-backed Government of National Accord is only one of the 
many factions vying for control in the country. The situation has devolved into a conflict 
between numerous armed groups and terrorist organizations, and there is no appreciable central 
governmental authority in the nation. Despite UN attempts to broker agreements between groups, 
                                                 
30 Charles Homans, “Responsibility to Protect: A Short History,” Foreign Policy, October 11, 2011, 
https://foreignpolicy.com/2011/10/11/responsibility-to-protect-a-short-history/. 
31 Peter Beaumont, “Yes, the UN has a duty to intervene. But when, where and how?” The Guardian, May 4, 2013, 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/may/04/un-syria-duty-to-intervene. 
32 Tom Esslemont, “As Syrian deaths mount, world’s ‘responsibility to protect’ takes a hit: experts,” Reuters, 
October 24, 2016 https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-syria-law/as-syrian-deaths-mount-worlds-
responsibility-to-protect-takes-a-hit-experts-idUSKCN12O2S3.  
33 Richard Roth, “U.N. Security Council approves no-fly zone in Libya,” CNN, March 18, 2011, 
http://edition.cnn.com/2011/WORLD/africa/03/17/libya.civil.war/index.html?hpt=T2. 
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Libya is now widely regarded as a failed state.34 When faced with the understanding that 
successfully installing and protecting the Government of the National Accord would require 
huge amounts of sustained effort, the UN faded out of the picture. While R2P succeeded in 
getting the UN to the table, it did not ultimately play a large role in helping the people of Libya 
achieve peace. In the wake of this failure of R2P, the UN chose, and has continued to choose, to 
remain largely on the sidelines in Syria. The main lesson learned from the application of R2P in 
Libya was that, in order to play a substantive role in the resolution of a war, the UN needed to 
commit much more than marginal involvement. If individual actors and international 
organizations had previously not become involved in conflicts because they were unwilling to 
expend the effort and resources to do so, R2P did little to address or mitigate those barriers. The 
reasons international organizations and actors were not intervening to address human rights 
abuses were not solved by R2P. Rather, nonintervention was due to practical factors that R2P did 
not address.  
These problems inherent to R2P made it clear that states and other actors do not 
undertake humanitarian intervention lightly. Before R2P, there was a sense that the international 
community had not tried hard enough to police humanitarian crises. However, waning 
enthusiasm for R2P is tied to the growing international realization that humanitarian intervention 
is difficult, an acknowledgment supported by its mixed track record. This international wariness 
is seen in the reluctance of countries and organizations to intervene for humanitarian purposes in 
Venezuela, Myanmar, and Syria, to pick three examples. However, little of this newfound 
skepticism and reluctance has extended to safe zones. Safe zones are often viewed as separate 
                                                 
34 Zineb Abdessadok, “Libya Today: From Arab Spring to failed state,” Aljazeera, May 30, 2017, 
https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2017/04/happening-libya-today-170418083223563.html. 
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from humanitarian intervention, and therefore not plagued by the systemic problems associated 
with humanitarian intervention. However, the reality could not be more different. Safe zones are 
a form of humanitarian intervention, not separate from it, and are tied up in the same 
complexities and difficulties as other forms of humanitarian intervention. Namely, safe zones are 
constrained by the same narrow international legal definition as humanitarian intervention, and 
they are often implemented by actors who do not fully realize the effort and resources required to 
undertake them successfully. It is ultimately illogical for the international community to be 
reluctant to pursue humanitarian intervention and not also be reluctant to implement safe zones.   
The reasons for these problems with humanitarian intervention can be explained on a 
theoretical level by an argument put forth by Edward Luttwak in Strategy: The Logic of War and 
Peace. While his argument is extensive, the main idea is that the systems of logic employed 
during peacetime and during war are not only different but are complete inverses of each other.  
For instance, “an advancing force can choose between two roads, one good and one bad, the first 
broad, direct, and well-paved, the second narrow, circuitous, and unpaved. Only in the 
paradoxical realm of strategy would the choice arise at all, because it is only in war that a bad 
road can be good precisely because it is bad and may therefore be less strongly defended or even 
left unguarded by the enemy.”35 He extrapolates this argument to discuss the paradoxical 
problems of humanitarian intervention, a notion that sounds so positive and reasonable but is 
rarely successful. Luttwak begins by noting that the largest motivation of an intervening body is 
to avoid casualties to its own forces.36 This is logical; in a war zone, the main motivation is often 
to simply survive. The disconnect with humanitarian intervention is that the practice is a self-
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imposed war to protect a third party. The knee-jerk reaction of self-preservation made by a third-
party soldier is to herself, and maybe her comrades. Her reaction to danger likely does not 
accommodate protecting a group of individuals who are not her countrymen. An internal UN 
review released in 2015 even, “found that UN peacekeeping missions routinely avoid using force 
to protect civilians who are under attack, intervening in only 20 percent of cases despite being 
authorized to do so by the UN Security Council.”37 
Luttwak argues that, despite this deep disconnect between the third-party intervenor and 
the group that needs protecting, the intervening force can pursue its own self-interest and still 
have a positive effect on the situation. The inclination of UN a peacekeeping force (Luttwak’s 
chosen example of an intervening actor) is generally to side with local belligerents, keeping the 
peace (in a relative sense) and protecting itself. Luttwak says that, in this scenario of backing the 
stronger local belligerent, “the result could be conducive to peace. For in that case, the UN 
presence would actually enhance the peacemaking potential of war, by helping the strong to 
defeat the weak that much faster and more decisively.”38   
A discussion of the morality of Luttwak’s argument falls outside of the scope of this 
paper, but the structure of his logic is applicable when considering the motivations of actors 
pursuing humanitarian intervention. Luttwak’s suggestion sounds jarring, but it is logical; a 
third-party cannot really be expected to put itself in harm’s way, but it can still play a role in 
minimizing the amount of time spent in war, therefore minimizing casualties. The problems lie in 
the fact that, while an intervening force wants to mitigate harm to itself, it is likely to be 
unwilling to take the extreme measures Luttwak suggests. The UN wants to save lives while 
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remaining a neutral force; it wants to protect the vulnerable population without putting its forces 
in a dangerous position, but it also wants to stay away from strong belligerents, or at least not 
actively support their goals. The main effect of this situation is that, “at best… forces remain the 
passive spectators of violence and outright massacres.”39   
Safe zones are areas of civility, so their creation and administration is often defined by 
the linear logic of peace. However, safe zones are necessarily erected in areas of conflict where 
the logic of war pervades. It is from this disconnect that major problems arise. Luttwak does note 
that intervention can still be justified, even if the international community cannot stomach the 
idea of supporting one side to quickly end a war, but only if the intervention tangibly protects 
civilians, “from the effects of the wars they are prolonging.”40 Derived from Luttwak’s theory of 
competing systems of logic, this chapter deconstructs the interests of actors intervening for 
humanitarian purposes, and how the level of an actor’s interest informs its will and ability to 
overcome challenges. 
The reality of humanitarian intervention is that it is complex, costly, and difficult to 
implement. Because of these large hurdles, countries and organizations tend to only intervene 
when it serves them in some way.  When discussing the case of nonintervention in Darfur, where 
the UN estimated 300,000 people were killed,41 Nick Grono wrote, “the sad reality is that Darfur 
simply does not matter enough, and Sudan matters too much for the international community to 
do more to stop the atrocities.”42 An entity will not spend resources and time and risk a possible 
negative outcome that could involve harm to its own forces if intervention does not somehow 
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align with its interests as a nation or an organization. A. Krieg, in Motivations for Humanitarian 
Intervention, explains this phenomenon as an, “assumption deriving from realism that states in 
the international arena should and do base their actions on self-interest or, in a broader sense, 
national interests.”43 This conception of self-interest does not inherently mean that a nation 
cannot intervene in a positive way, or that the self-interest of one nation would not align with the 
interests of a group within a conflict. However, the international legal structures for humanitarian 
intervention have also created a system that allows for ‘power plays’ poorly disguised as 
humanitarian intervention.44 Humanitarian intervention, including safe zones, allows a country to 
intervene in the affairs of other nations and pursue goals, whether helpful or harmful, while 
being protected by a system that justifies and vindicates its actions. Edward Luttwak described 
this situation through the lens of UN intervention, as, “[satisfying] interventionist urges 
mandated by member states, or even motivated by their own institutional ambitions.”45 The legal 
and social structures that normalized humanitarian intervention in response to increasing civilian 
death in war zones were predicated legitimately on the belief that, “states should not be able to 
commit mass murder by hiding behind national sovereignty.” 46 This sentiment paradoxically 
lays the foundation for an actor to abrogate the sovereignty of a nation to further its own goals. If 
a country is entering a conflict for reasons of self-interest, the country is likely to greatly 
complicate the conflict and skew toward actions fulfilling self-interest over legitimate 
humanitarian actions.  
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Additionally, rendering aid to a group may involve complex considerations of how best 
to gather individuals, when some may be reluctant. In Just and Unjust Wars, Michael Walzer 
considers the three main reasons individuals would be reluctant to enter a zone of safety 
established by a third party. He identifies these to be, “[a] hope to welcome the enemy and profit 
from his victory, and from those who are unwilling to ‘desert’ the patriotic cause… [or] the 
unwillingness to leave one’s home to separate from one’s friends and family, to become a 
refugee.”47 This chapter suggests the additional motivation, particularly during humanitarian 
crises, that some individuals would choose to flee the area or nation altogether, rather than enter 
a safe zone within its borders. Creating a safe zone that includes all of the vulnerable individuals 
belonging to a specific group would mean removing the agency of precisely those individuals 
who wished to flee or wished to stay where they were. While Article 78 of the Fourth Geneva 
Convention grants an actor the power to, “[if considered necessary] for reasons imperative to 
security, [or] to take safety measures concerning protected persons, it may, at the most, subject 
them to assigned residence or to internment.”48 Notably, the words ‘considered necessary’ are 
problematic in this article as they are open to interpretation.  
   An uncharitable view of this problem, offered by Edward Luttwak, is that safe zones, 
“inhibit the normal remedy of endangered citizens, which is to escape from the combat zone.”49 
A stance that better balances Luttwak’s opposition and the possible positive aspects of 
constraining unwilling populations is that, while removing agency from noncombatants leaves 
them vulnerable to abuse, fleeing can also be highly dangerous. There may also be legitimate 
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situations in which moving all individuals to one place allows an actor to more effectively 
protect civilians and render aid.  
The doctrine of double effect can be useful in considering situations where removing the 
agency of individuals is justified. Double effect requires that “the act is good in itself or at least 
indifferent; the direct effect is morally acceptable; the intention of the actor is good; and the good 
effect is sufficiently good to compensate for allowing the evil effect.”50  While this framework is 
generally applied to the killing of noncombatants in war zones, the proposition of double effect is 
a better framework than Article 78 for considering when the removal of agency from individuals 
in war zones is justified.  
Ultimately, even if the intentions of the actor are genuinely good, the actual process of 
intervening can be problematic. The interests of an actor inform its willingness to overcome the 
problems of intervention. The greater the interests of an actor in a given conflict, the larger its 
will to overcome the challenges it will inevitably face in establishing a safe zone. Perhaps one of 
the largest obstacles safe zones pose is that they cannot be implemented according to the 
international legal standards of what constitutes legitimate humanitarian intervention. In 
Humanitarian Intervention in Contemporary Conflict, Ramsbotham and Woodhouse argued that 
legitimate humanitarian intervention must involve humanity, impartiality, neutrality, and 
universality.51 Essentially, humanitarian intervention must seek to increase the welfare of human 
beings, aim to relieve the suffering of individuals regardless of identity, aid individuals without 
taking a side in the conflict, and support universal common values.52  
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At the heart of their argument are the ideas of impartiality and neutrality. Woodhouse and 
Ramsbotham described impartiality as “[making] no discrimination as to nationality, race, 
religious beliefs, class, or political opinions,”53 and neutrality as, “not [taking] sides in hostilities 
or [engaging] at any time in controversies of a political, racial, religious, or ideological nature.”54 
These two notions sound similar but have important differences. Doctors Without Borders 
explains impartiality as not discriminating based on the identity of an individual, meaning 
rendering services to all individuals in conflict zones.55 Doctors Without Borders additionally 
explains neutrality as not taking sides in a larger conflict.56 In this sense, impartiality can be 
conceived of as a tenet on an individual level, and neutrality is a systemic notion. While these 
ideals may sound reasonable, they stand in complete opposition to the reality of humanitarian 
intervention. It is virtually impossible to intervene in a truly impartial and neutral manner. 
Intervention in a humanitarian crisis inherently requires taking a side. Otherwise an intervention 
would have no effect on the conflict and offer no reprieve from violence for civilians.  
This situation is particularly clear with safe zones. An intervening actor has to enter a 
conflict, create an area of safety protecting a certain group, and physically defend it.  Karl von 
Clausewitz famously defined the mechanism of war as: “each of the adversaries [forcing] the 
hand of the other… [resulting in] a reciprocal action.”57 Invading a country and creating a safe 
zone is forcing the belligerents’ hands; a reciprocal action should be expected. This is the seed of 
many problems with safe zones. International organizations and other actors attempt to remain 
neutral and impartial to avoid looking like they are having an effect on the larger conflict, but the 
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fact of the matter is that they are, and they do. Luttwak described this phenomenon: “[The] 
common, inherent characteristic is that [the intervenor inserts] themselves in war situations while 
refusing to engage in combat.”58 While every intervening actor becomes involved in a 
humanitarian crisis because it has some interest in the conflict, an actor is very unlikely to have 
levels of interest that justify risking the lives of its service members for a third-party. In order for 
the interests of an actor to create a willingness to accept the possible imperilment of its forces, its 
interests likely have to be related to national security interest or some form of vital economic 
interest. A third-party humanitarian disaster would have to be very specific to fulfill those 
requirements, and very rarely are those requirements evident in a conflict where an actor is 
undertaking humanitarian intervention. Therefore, the actors generally intervening in 
humanitarian crises do not have adequate interests in the situation to create the willingness to 
overcome the practical challenge of danger. It is from this disconnect that many of the problems 
and shortcomings of safe zones as a tool of humanitarian intervention arise.  
 There are additional practical considerations. While the interest of an actor informs its 
will to overcome some of these practical considerations, there is another step between 
willingness and execution. Great enough interests create willingness to overcome practical 
challenges, but the actor must have the ability to do so. If the will of an actor is commensurate 
with the effort needed to overcome the practical challenges of safe zone implementation, and it 
has the military, political, and economic ability to do so, then the operation can be successful. 
However, these practical challenges can be great, and even an actor with large enough interests 
and a high level of willingness may still lack the ability in material or political terms to 
overcome these practical challenges. Conor Foley, author of The Thin Blue Line: How 
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Humanitarianism Went to War, said in an interview that, “humanitarian interventions virtually 
never resolve humanitarian crises… and the attempt to portray humanitarian interventions as a 
panacea is damaging because it is just not true that they work. Over the last twenty years, there 
are very few that have worked.”59  
Foley argues that humanitarian intervention can only be successful under narrow 
circumstances, namely when an intervention is, “supported by the U.N. Security Council… 
properly financed, [has] proper goals, and those where interveners understand their mandate.”60 
The common denominator of these factors is a high level of resources, organization, and clarity. 
These factors can only be fulfilled by a deeply committed actor with an array of resources 
including, but not limited to, funds, armaments, and personnel.  Furthermore, even in situations 
where the intervening actor is fully aware of these considerations and willing to fund an 
intervention, it may be materially unable to overcome some of the practical challenges of the 
project. How can an actor protect a group that is far away, or dispersed across a wide terrain? 
How can an actor protect a group in difficult terrain? If one group is being protected from 
another, how can the actor distinguish between the groups? When does an actor intervene? How 
does an actor coordinate between agencies and groups? How does an actor gauge the levels of 
weaponry needed for a specific context? Does the actor need air power as well as ground troops? 
Where does the actor put the safe zone? Should the location be easily accessible for individuals 
fleeing the conflict, or somewhere more strategically located for defensive purposes, should the 
need arise? How can an actor ensure stability in the area after it leaves? The questions governing 
these practical aspects continue on and on. They are all questions that can be answered and 
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planned for in most scenarios given proper time, resources, and manpower. The reality remains 
whether or not countries and organizations can ever have adequate interests to create a level of 
willingness which, coupled with the material resources of the actor, can overcome these hurdles 
and have a chance at proving successful. 
If the interests of an actor are not large enough to create an appropriate level of will, there 
is a moral hazard problem with intervention. The current system of humanitarian intervention 
creates a moral hazard for the international community. Intervening in conflicts removes the 
need for the international community to pursue, implement, and oversee peace plans or military 
actions that actually address the conflict. Instead of undertaking that difficult work, international 
organizations and individual actors have a built-in ‘easy way out’ option. They can pursue 
humanitarian intervention to ‘address’ the problem, or at least appear to be addressing the 
problem to the international community. While humanitarian intervention does not create a 
moral hazard for actors in a vacuum, it does more often than not in the reality of the international 
system. As established above, the likelihood that any given actor has interests large enough to 
make it willing to utilize the full power of its political and military ability for intervention is very 
low. The system is such, however, that actors are not mandated or even necessarily expected to 
fulfill those basic requirements before intervening in a conflict. Therefore, an actor has an 
incentive to intervene half-heartedly in a conflict rather than pursue an arduous diplomatic 
process or a bald military intervention.  Additionally, Luttwak explains that “war may be a 
great evil, but it does have great virtue. By consuming and destroying the material and moral 
resources needed to keep fighting, war prevents its own continuation.”61 Essentially, only a war 
that has ended after burning out the resources needed to wage war can lead to a sustainable 
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peace.62 He goes on to argue that, “Since 1945, wars among lesser powers have rarely been 
allowed to follow their natural course. Instead, they have typically been interrupted.”63 The 
interruptions of humanitarian intervention prolong the conflict and allow the belligerent pockets 
of time without fighting when it can regroup, reposition, and retrain.64 Intervening for 
humanitarian purposes without having appropriate interest, willingness, and ability creates a 
dangerous situation for the group in need of protection. Despite this fact, the international 
community upholds a system where half-cocked humanitarian intervention fills the same 
ceremonial role of ‘involvement’ that undertaking actual, tangible steps toward solving the 
conflict would. Ultimately, safe zones and humanitarian intervention are mired in extensive 
obstacles. While the international community has begun to slowly recognize this in relation to 
humanitarian intervention, the same hesitance has not yet been extended to safe zones.  
This thesis will analyze the case studies through the lens of the interests of the actors. 
Once the interest of each actor is established, this analysis will consider how that interest informs 
the willingness of the actor to overcome the practical challenges safe zones posed in each case 
study. The chapter will then discuss how the interests and willingness of the actor informed its 
ability to undertake the project. Ultimately, the analysis will consider how moral hazard played a 
role in each scenario, and how a consideration of interest, will, ability, and moral hazard for each 
case study informs the success or failure of the safe zone.  
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Case Study: Srebrenica 
History 
Srebrenica is a small town in Bosnia and Herzegovina; despite its small population, lack 
of industry, and mountainous terrain, the city was the location of the largest act of genocide to 
occur on European soil since the end of WWII. In the summer of 1995, the Bosnian Serb army 
murdered roughly 8,000 Muslim Bosnians in a UN safe zone under the protection of a battalion 
of Dutch peacekeepers working in concert with NATO air forces.65 
The historical context for the genocide at Srebrenica is complex; the conflict in Bosnia 
was a subset of a convoluted civil war in Yugoslavia.  Yugoslavia was originally established 
after World War One by merging areas of the former Austro-Hungarian empire with the 
Kingdom of Serbia, resulting in an ethnically and religiously diverse nation.66  Following World 
War Two, Yugoslavia formed a communist government led by Josip Tito. The country was 
comprised of six territories: Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia 
(which also included two independent territories, Kosovo and Vojvodina), and Slovenia. 
Yugoslavia’s ethnic groups included, but were not limited to, Serbs, Croats, Montenegrins, 
Slovenes, Macedonians, and Slavic Muslims.67 Yugoslavia was comprised of six administrative 
units; each territory represented the strongest concentration of each ethnicity. Serbs lived 
predominantly in Serbia, Croats lived predominantly in Croatia, and so on. The exception to this 
was Bosnia and Herzegovina, which had fairly equal populations of Eastern Orthodox Serbs, 
Muslim Slavs (commonly referred to as Bosniaks), and a large minority of Catholic Croats. It is 
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important to note that no single ethnic group comprised a majority in Bosnia.68       
   
Tito’s death in 1980 marked the end of a rule that had suppressed ethnic tensions through 
promoting brotherhood and unity and oppressing dissent. Tito’s death was followed by an 
economic crisis and the beginning of the fall of communism.69 These changes led to an increase 
in ethnic nationalism across the territories, coinciding with the 1986 appointment of Slobodan 
Milošević as the head of the ruling communist party in Serbia.70 Milošević and his supporters 
overthrew state governments in Serbia, Montenegro, Vojvodina, and Kosovo, instating leaders 
who aligned with their ideals. He began calling for the unity and centralization of Yugoslavia 
under a mainly Serb government, which was opposed by Slovenia, Macedonia, and Croatia, who 
wished for the territories and their predominant ethnic groups to gain greater independence.71 
Croatia eventually declared independence from Yugoslavia, and this move increased tensions 
with Serbia because Croatia had a large minority of Serbs.72 Slovenia then declared 
independence, and with violence between Croatia, Slovenia, and Serbia mounting, the 
international community tried and failed to reach a peace deal. The conflict became centered 
around that fact that Milošević had become the de facto leader of Yugoslavia, and the other 
ethnic groups in their respective territories wished to leave Yugoslavia and its Serb-dominated 
rule.  Milošević opposed the disintegration of Yugoslavia by supporting rebelling Serb minorities 
in other territories.  
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This ethnic violence eventually spread to Bosnia. Bosnians, primarily Bosniaks, voted for 
independence in a referendum denounced by Bosnian Serb leaders and boycotted by most 
Bosnian Serbs.73 Following this vote, Serbs in Bosnia declared their own independent republic, 
and Milošević sent Serbs from the Yugoslav Army to serve in the Bosnian Serb army.74 The 
army began seizing Serb-majority areas within Bosnia and launching mortar attacks on Sarajevo, 
the Bosnian capital. The international community started closely monitoring the situation in 
Bosnia, in addition to the larger conflict in Yugoslavia. The UN established a peacekeeping force 
in Bosnia in February of 1992. In the early days, the UN tasked this peacekeeping force, 
UNPROFOR, with stabilizing Sarajevo, namely through protecting the functions of its airport.75 
Two months later in April, the Serbs began a campaign of ethnic cleansing against Bosniaks in 
north and east Bosnia. In August, the UN discovered the existence of a Serb-run concentration 
camp in Omarska.76 In September of 1992, the UN envoy to Bosnia reported to the UN Human 
Rights Commission that Serbs were responsible for most of the crimes in Bosnia, and the UN 
expanded the mandate of UNPROFOR to include protecting humanitarian relief convoys.   
Violence further increased in the following year as Serb forces dominated the Bosniak 
army, and in May of 1993, the Security Council was faced with the inevitable fall of a Bosniak 
stronghold at Srebrenica.  In Humanitarian Intervention and Safety Zones: Iraq, Bosnia, and 
Rwanda, Carol McQueen described the situation as, “the town was entirely surrounded and 
under siege with Serbs blocking access to the humanitarian convoys aiming to deliver food to its 
now swollen population of 60,000.”77 General Philippe Morillon, the commander of 
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UNPROFOR forces in Bosnia, went to Srebrenica without the permission of his superiors; once 
there, he hoisted a UN flag and announced that Srebrenica was under the protection of the United 
Nations.78 Morillon thought his words would be a temporary promise to the civilians in 
Srebrenica, believing that a peace plan would soon be reached. Mounting pressure on Srebrenica 
by Bosnian Serbs, however, forced the Security Council’s hand. Resolution 819, passed the 
Security Council in May 1993, officially established Srebrenica as a safe zone.79 The 
UNPROFOR peacekeepers tasked with protecting Srebrenica were from a battalion of Dutch 
soldiers often referred to as Dutchbat.  
Over the following months, the UN executed a plan to establish Srebrenica as a safe 
zone. According to the resolution, Srebrenica and its surrounding area were to be, “free from any 
armed attack or any other hostile attack,” and while this objective was clear, UNPROFOR’s 
expanded mandate was not.80 Peacekeepers and their commanders were unsure if their job was 
only to deter Serb forces, or, as the mandate also suggested, to, “[act] in self-defense, to take the 
necessary measures, including the use of force, in reply to bombardments against safe areas.”81 
Responding to the bombardment of the safe area and deterring the Serb force were not 
necessarily complementary actions; the former made UNPROFOR wary of escalating the 
conflict. Additionally, UNPROFOR superiors maintained that “the execution of the mandate was 
secondary to the security of UN personnel,” giving Dutchbat soldiers a catch-all excuse for 
selectively executing their convoluted and contradictory mandate.82 The mandate also authorized 
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the use of, “air power in and around the safe areas,” which, in the case of UNPROFOR, meant 
NATO air assistance.83  
In late spring of the same year, France delivered a report to the Security Council which 
suggested two options that would, “suffice to cover — sanctuarize— the areas.”84 In order to 
protect the tens of thousands of Bosniaks who had taken shelter from the Bosnian Serb army at 
Srebrenica, the UN needed to undertake serious measures. The light option suggested by the 
French involved 10,000 soldiers. 85 The heavy option, the only one the French report found likely 
to “oppose aggression” against the UN safe area, called for 45,000 troops.86 The suggested 
criteria for the involvement of airpower in all of these cases was in response to, “shelling of the 
safe areas, armed incursion into the safe areas, and impeding the free movement of 
UNPROFOR.”87  However, even as years passed after this 1993 proclamation, the suggestions 
remained unimplemented. McQueen boils the reason for this inaction down to the fact that “there 
never was any intention to defend the safe areas through deployment of ground troops.”88   
Srebrenica was additionally, “difficult to defend. Although the terrain was extremely 
hilly and densely forested, the enclave itself was relatively small… [it was] located in [a] valley 
that could be overlooked from the surrounding hills… in direct view of Serb artillery 
positions.”89  Dutchbat had two bases and thirteen observation posts (OPs) protecting a fifty-
kilometer perimeter in Srebrenica and its neighboring town of Potočari.90 However, by 1995, the 
year the massacre at Srebrenica would take place, Dutchbat only had 429 men, and only half of 
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them were infantry soldiers.91 The issue of who exactly was being protected in the enclave 
compounded this problem with troop numbers. While the safe zone was intended only for 
civilian Bosniaks fleeing the Serb advance, “there were thousands of armed Muslims based in 
the safe area.”92  
The situation was growing increasingly tenuous for Dutchbat as, “the ceasefire was 
regularly violated by both sides, and shipments of humanitarian supplies… were habitually 
obstructed by the Serbs. Given the inconsistent mandate and limited strength, the Dutch felt they 
could... do little more than watch, count, log, and report violations.”93 The final Serb attack on 
Srebrenica began on July 6, 1995. The Serbs shelled vulnerable OPs, most of which were 
positioned in the valley for the sole purpose of observation and were poorly located for tactical 
conflict.94 The Commander of Dutchbat, Lieutenant Colonel Karremans, was tasked with 
choosing between three available options: returning Serb fire in an act of self-defense warranted 
by UNPROFOR’s mandate, which would risk retaliation from the superiorly manned Serb 
forces; requesting air support from NATO with the possibility that such actions would greatly 
escalate the conflict; and pursuing a de-escalation of the situation through diplomacy.95 
Karremans opted for diplomacy, though repeated attempts to reach out to the Serb forces were 
unsuccessful.  
Conditions deteriorated further over the following days.  The Serb army continued 
provocative attacks around Srebrenica. Lieutenant-General Janvier, acting UNPROFOR 
commander in Bosnia, refused several requests for air support, believing that the Serb forces 
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were not serious about taking the enclave. 96 He additionally feared that mounting an air attack 
would only escalate the conflict.97 Dutchbat forces on the ground were outgunned and 
outmanned by the Serb forces, and additionally, “believed that they could not be expected to put 
up any meaningful defense of the enclave.”98 Even if Karremans could convince Janvier to 
secure close air support from NATO, such an attack could trigger the use of artillery and mortars 
by the Serb forces, endangering Dutchbat and Srebrenica unless all or most Serb weapon systems 
could be eliminated in the air raid.99  
The Serb army continued to capture vulnerable OPs, and additionally took a number of 
Dutchbat soldiers hostage.100 On the day of July 11, 1995, it became undeniable that the Serb 
objective was to capture Srebrenica, and that Dutchbat was simultaneously incapable of 
mounting an effective counterattack and also largely unwilling to do so. UN officials and NATO 
entities eventually approved calls from Dutchbat requesting airstrikes on roughly forty targets.101 
However, after only a number of the forty targets were destroyed, the Serb army issued a return 
ultimatum that, “if the air attacks were not stopped forthwith, they would kill captured Dutch 
soldiers and shell the refugees and Dutchbat indiscriminately.”102 The Dutch defense minister 
called for an immediate stop to the bombardment. That afternoon, when Karremans began 
negotiations with the Serbs, there were roughly 25,000 Bosniaks in and around the Dutch 
compounds.103   
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Though ‘negotiations’ lasted a number of days, and Dutchbat did not leave Srebrenica 
until July 21st, the Serb army faced few barriers in executing their plan of ethnic cleansing. The 
Serbs had begun quietly deporting Bosniaks almost immediately after Srebrenica fell. The UN 
and the Dutch government reached an agreement with the Serb army that Dutchbat should 
‘monitor the evacuation of the refugees,’ which, in practice, meant that Dutch soldiers were to 
help separate the women and children from the men.104 At that point, any option to also save the 
Bosniaks was lost. The compound had already been overrun.  
The Serbs murdered the Bosniak men and boys; in all, roughly 8,000 Bosniaks were 
killed in a blatant act of genocide at Srebrenica.105 Years later at the Hague, Fouad Riad, a judge 
on the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia said, “These are truly scenes 
from hell, written on the darkest pages of human history.”106  
Analysis  
The tragedy at Srebrenica was, at every point until the end, completely avoidable. The 
negligent decisions of the international community, particularly the members of the Security 
Council and the Dutch government, allowed the massacre to occur. After years of watching the 
chaos in Yugoslavia unfold as widespread ethnic violence took root in Bosnia, the international 
community entered the conflict slowly and without much of a plan. The establishment of 
UNPROFOR itself is a testament to this; it was originally tasked with protecting a single airport 
in a region plagued by conflict. The UN did not have much of an interest in the conflict outside 
of a genuine concern for the loss of human life.      
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 It was only after the international community became aware of the severity of the 
genocide and the Serb concentration camps, hearkening back to images of the Holocaust, that 
international pressure forced the UN to act in earnest. The UN intended to restrict its actions 
solely to supplying increased humanitarian aid; the notion of establishing the safe zone at 
Srebrenica was not planned, rather it was the culmination of mounting ethnic violence and 
Morillon’s rogue proclamation to the civilians who had fled to the valley. McQueen explains that 
“designating Srebrenica a safe area was an ad hoc response to a crisis: community interests 
dictated that something be done, and state interests enabled acceptance, albeit hesitant, of the 
policy, perhaps explaining why no clear enforcement measures were considered at the time 
[Resolution] 819 was adopted.”107 When faced with massive human loss and genocide, the UN 
made a knee jerk decision to implement safe zones because, on the face of it, the action 
addressed the crisis. The UN did not decide to institute a safe zone because of increased interest, 
or a serious consideration of its willingness to increase military and financial exposure in the 
conflict. The problems began to arise, as noted by McQueen, with the implementation of the 
policy.   
It was, at all points, clear what needed to be done to protect the safe zone. That should 
not be equivocated. It is clear from the French suggestions to the Security Council directly 
following the passage of Resolution 819 that the military requirements of the undertaking were 
understood. All of the actors involved understood that a large number of highly armed soldiers 
with air support was needed to ensure the protection and stability of Srebrenica as a safe area. 
The disconnect between the establishment of the safe area and the implementation of the steps 
required to protect it can be boiled down to the interests, or lack thereof, of the UN.  
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It is important to note again that the soldiers protecting the outpost were Dutch.  Luttwak 
argues that, in multinational military scenarios, even, “the best-trained and best-paid forces of the 
most ambitious armies… avoid risk at all costs,” to minimize casualties or avoid them entirely. 
The Dutch had no reason to sacrifice their soldiers to protect Bosniaks. The UN was aware of 
this dynamic and wrote the mandate accordingly. Dutchbat was not required by its mandate to 
protect the safe area if doing so put peacekeepers at risk. Additionally, the Dutch defense 
minister, a man with no involvement in the UN or UNPROFOR, was the individual who ordered 
the UN’s capitulation to the Serbs. The minister was naturally most loyal to the five hundred 
Dutchbat soldiers at Srebrenica; he valued their survival over the survival of the men and boys in 
the enclave. This observation should not serve as a moral indictment of the Dutchbat soldiers or 
the Dutch defense minister, as those lines of thought fall outside of the scope of this argument. 
This observation, however, is valuable to note in considering the interests and willingness of the 
actors in this tragedy. The troops generally involved in UN interventions are not native to the 
place of the conflict, which complicates their incentives and desires, and thus increases the 
precariousness of the situation for the protected group.   
Dutchbat soldiers, in addition to being more committed to their own survival than to 
protecting the safe area, were also poorly equipped. In tactical terms, the safe area at Srebrenica 
was disastrous. Honig and Both write that “the Dutch were outnumbered, surrounded, and the 
city was indefensible.”108 When, in the final days of the Serb attack, UNPROFOR issued an 
order for Dutchbat to employ, “every possible measure… to reinforce these positions, including 
measures related to weapons,” Dutchbat simply could not fulfill the task.109 Asking 500 men to 
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defend a group of foreign civilians when they are greatly outnumbered and lack adequate 
military resources is absurd.   
The UN’s low willingness to properly implement the safe zone at Srebrenica is clear in 
the number of Dutch soldiers sent, and the armaments with which they were supplied. The UN’s 
lack of proper action regarding the military French suggestions could perhaps be forgiven if the 
UN had more quickly realized the danger of the situation and responded appropriately. The UN, 
however, did not. It chose, at various points, to not use NATO close air support to aid the 
outnumbered Dutchbat forces. At numerous junctures in the existence of Srebrenica as a safe 
area, and certainly in the earlier days of the final Serb offensive, air support could have been 
used to defend the safe area. UN and UNPROFOR officials simply waited too long to implement 
it; when they finally fell back on their NATO allies in the final days of the conflict at Srebrenica, 
the Serb army had already taken Dutch hostages. While Janvier’s and UNPROFOR’s main worry 
regarding the use of air support was escalating the conflict, the judgment call was a bad one on 
two counts. First, there was no legitimate alternative to the use of close air support, as Dutchbat 
was clearly incapable of mounting a defense of the safe area. Second, there was no reason to 
believe that the Serb attack was not a legitimate attempt to take the safe area. Janvier’s and 
UNPROFOR’s refusal to use NATO close air support reflected their lack of willingness to be 
involved in the conflict. At this critical juncture, Janvier and UNPROFOR made a decision that 
aligned with their interests and willingness over the safety of the Bosniaks and the proper 
execution of the safe zone.    
McQueen suggests that “states underestimated, perhaps willfully, the extent to which it 
would be difficult to implement an effective safe area policy: they seemed to be under the 
illusion that if the Security Council proclaimed the existence of safe areas, local belligerents 
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would take them seriously.”110 Her words effectively explain the series of events that led to the 
downfall of Srebrenica. The entire enterprise at Srebrenica was based on the belief that merely 
saying the outpost was a UN-protected safe area would make it one. However, this was 
completely at odds with the reality of the situation as observed by the French and noted to the 
Security Council as early as 1993. Even as Serbs repeatedly shelled the compound, Janvier 
feared that “larger-scale air strikes… would risk drawing UNPROFOR into an all-out war with 
the Serbs.”111 In reality, the UN had been involved in a war with the Serbs since the 
establishment of the safe area in 1993, or, at the very least, since the beginning of the Serb 
offensive roughly a week before the enclave fell. After the severity of the situation became clear 
during the final Serb assault, Sergeant Batalona, who worked in the operations room at 
Srebrenica as part of the UNPROFOR mission, said that “everybody got a fright. You could 
easily get killed… as far as I knew, we had not been sent to Srebrenica to defend the enclave, but 
rather as some kind of spruced-up observers.”112   
It is ultimately important to look at the disaster of Srebrenica as a failure of the most 
basic objective of humanitarian intervention and safe areas. It is clear that the safe area did not 
protect the individuals it claimed that it could keep secure. State and international organizations 
undertake humanitarian intervention to restore rights to civilians in conflict zones when war has 
taken the rights away. In the case of the safe area at Srebrenica, the Serbs were committing 
genocide against the Bosniaks; these acts spanned murder, rape, and forced detention. The safe 
area was meant to be a physical space where individuals could shelter and have basic access to 
vital resources like food, water, and medical care. In creating the safe zone, the UN guaranteed 
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these rights to the people who sought refuge there. Because of this guarantee, persecuted 
individuals came to Srebrenica specifically. Had there not been a guarantee of safety, individuals 
would have behaved differently. As Luttwak suggested, many individuals likely would have fled 
as far as they could. They certainly would not have congregated by the tens of thousands in a 
deep valley in the center of Bosnia with no avenues for easy escape.  The disaster at Srebrenica 
was massive because the UN had gathered large numbers of Bosniaks in one place.  
The actual act of gathering, in this case, is not problematic in a vacuum. The UN offered 
protection in this area and people freely elected to seek that protection. The promise that the UN 
made is also not, in a vacuum, problematic. The UN declared to Bosniaks, to Serbs, and to the 
entire world, that Bosniaks fleeing the genocide would be safe at Srebrenica, guarded by the 
auspices of the United Nations. What is deeply problematic, and what is at the crux of the 
horrifying events that happened in Srebrenica, is the UN’s lack of preparedness to keep its 
promise. While there could be extenuating factors− perhaps the UN probably did not realize at 
the outset that keeping its promise would require a large-scale military operation−  it became 
clear quickly that such action was required to adequately protect the enclave. In the face of this 
clarity, with the UN in possession of this objective truth, the organization chose not to pursue the 
actions that would protect the safe zone. These actions could have included increasing troops on 
the ground or using NATO close air support. Additionally, the UN underestimated the challenges 
of the safe zone itself; it allowed armed Bosniaks to take shelter within the safe zone’s borders, 
which both invalidated UNPROFOR’s mandate of impartiality and neutrality and likely further 
incentivized the Serb attack on the enclave. The UN’s ambivalence regarding the armed 
Bosniaks within the safe further supports the argument that the UN lacked the interest and will to 
properly implement the safe zone. The UN could have stopped the armed Bosniaks from entering 
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the safe area, or retroactively addressed their presence in the enclave. This situation additionally 
reveals the complexities of creating a safe space for a targeted population. It is very difficult to 
distinguish between groups in a conflict, and more so to distinguish civilians from guerilla 
fighters. Creating a safe area without accidentally harboring the wrong group or harboring 
military forces requires large amounts of effort and attention to detail. The UN undertaking at 
Srebrenica lacked those aspects externally in relation to the larger conflict with the Serbs, and 
also internally in the governance of the safe area.   
Ultimately, the safe area at Srebrenica created an avenue for the international community 
to ‘address the situation’ in Bosnia without actually addressing the root causes of the conflict. 
Because the UN had little interest in the conflict, the idea of creating a safe zone presented a 
moral hazard. The UN could silence international calls for action through implementing a safe 
zone, an option it believed to require less effort and involvement than other forms of 
intervention. By implementing peacekeeping forces and creating an international coalition 
through NATO to provide air support, the UN could show that it was trying to help the situation. 
In reality, when faced with the remarkable complexity of the conflict, humanitarian intervention 
provided an alternative to becoming militarily or diplomatically involved. When looking at the 
physical devastation of the wars and the images of ethnic cleansing in Bosnia, the UN felt 
pressured by the international community to take action. Humanitarian intervention allowed the 
UN to do so, fulfilling its essentially symbolic duty with as little commitment as possible.  
Humanitarian intervention and the use of safe zones creates a moral hazard for the 
international community accordingly. When an actor does not have interests that inform a level 
of willingness commensurate with practical challenges, and the actor intervenes in a crisis 
anyway, moral hazard plays a role. The actor feels pressure to address the conflict, but its low 
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levels of interest motivate it to choose the easiest option. Only, it is a misconception that 
humanitarian intervention and safe zones are an easier way out than other diplomatic or military 
solutions. As demonstrated, humanitarian intervention is difficult to successfully undertake and 
requires large amounts of effort, commitment, and funding. With the safe zone at Srebrenica, the 
UN was attempting to put a band-aid on the gushing wound of the war in Yugoslavia. Instead of 
taking on the labor-intensive task of treating the injury with a method such as peace talks, the 
UN chose what it believed to be the least consuming option. Ultimately, not only did the safe 
zone not address the larger conflict in Bosnia or Yugoslavia, but because the UN was not 
prepared to surmount the challenges of the safe zone, thousands of innocent lives were lost. This 
line of analysis is important because the continued popularity of safe areas allows actors in the 
international community an avenue to symbolically address crises. Not only does choosing this 
avenue keep actors from actually addressing crises and helping the individuals experiencing 
them, but, if safe zones are this chosen avenue of avoiding obligation, the likelihood of 
increasing harm, rather than mitigating it, is high.  
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Case Study: Operation Provide Comfort, Iraqi Kurdistan 
History 
Operation Provide Comfort was a humanitarian aid mission to provide resources and 
areas of safety for Kurds in northern Iraq. It was undertaken by the same multinational coalition, 
helmed by the United States, that executed military operations during Operation Desert Storm. 
The conflict between the Kurds and the Iraqi government that ultimately forced many Kurds to 
flee was primarily rooted in the history of the region− namely how European powers and the 
United States divided the area of Kurdistan and its roughly thirty million Kurdish residents 
following the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire.113 Kurds, an ethnic group tracing back to 
indigenous groups on the plains of Mesopotamia, are racially and ethnically distinct from 
Arabs.114 The majority of Kurds are Sunni Muslims, though some Kurds subscribe to other 
religious practices.115 Following World War One, Kurdistan was divided into modern-day 
Turkey, Syria, Iran, Armenia, and Iraq. Kurds now live predominantly in south-eastern Turkey, 
north-eastern Syria, northern Iraq, north-western Iran, and south-western Armenia.116 Though 
they are the fourth largest ethnic group in the Middle East, their statelessness and distinct identity 
have led to serious discrimination. This discrimination and hatred runs so deep that Turkey has 
even conducted a bombing campaign against Syrian Kurds despite the fact that Syrian Kurds are 
fighting against Assad’s forces in concert with the Turkish army.117 Sustained and violent 
othering of Kurds across the Middle East has aided the creation of an independent Kurdish 
identity bolstered by powerful Kurdish military units and political groups.   
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 The case of Iraqi Kurdistan, the Kurdish territory in northern Iraq, is unique. Today, Iraqi 
Kurdistan is an autonomous, largely self-governed region with consulates separate from Iraq’s in 
nations across the globe.118 Its capital is Erbil and its roughly eight million citizens are governed 
by the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG).119  Iraqi Kurdistan is more prosperous than Iraq 
in a variety of ways: the KRG oversees better school systems, decent access to medical care, 
secure oil fields, and comparatively high levels of foreign investment.120  Not only does Iraqi 
Kurdistan have a generally higher quality of life than Iraq, but that quality of life has been 
maintained over the past half-decade as Iraqi forces battled ISIS. The power of Iraqi Kurdistan’s 
army, the Peshmerga, proved to be a successful deterrent to ISIS’s aggression. The terrorist 
group left Kurdish territory mostly alone, and the Peshmerga even seized the opportunity to take 
more Iraqi land in the chaos of the fight against ISIS.121 In 2017, an independence referendum in 
Iraqi Kurdistan received an overwhelming majority of votes, leading to a declaration of 
independence by Masoud Barzani, the leader of the KRG.  Though the central Iraqi government 
opposed this bid for independence and it eventually failed, its original success makes it clear that 
Iraqi Kurdistan is a powerful player in Iraq and the Middle East. The power of this Kurdish 
faction stirs questions of the possibility of eventual independence, or even the creation of a full 
Kurdish state as the Iraqi, Turkish, and Syrian governments continue to fray.122     
 The rise of Iraqi Kurdistan was a direct result of Operation Provide Comfort. Before 
international intervention in the early 1990s, the Kurdish situation in Iraq was bleak. In 1970, 
Saddam Hussein, then Vice President of Iraq, reached an agreement with the Kurds to end a 
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revolt in the north. While the agreement gave Kurds increased autonomy, Hussein began a 
sustained campaign against them in the following years.123 In the early 1980s, the U.S. began 
selling Iraq items to make chemical weapons with the intention of arming Iraq against Iran, 
though the operation also supplied Hussein with the means to use chemical weapons against Iraqi 
Kurdish resistance fighters.124 Following a 1988 incident where Hussein killed 5,000 Kurds with 
these U.S.-supplied chemical weapons, America deemed its alliance with Iraq in the conflict 
against Iran too important to change its policies. Ultimately, “the United States did not even 
impose sanctions,” against Iraq, or stop supplying these materials.125  
In 1991, after Operation Desert Storm and the U.S. victory in Kuwait, the Kurds revolted 
again. It was likely their best opportunity to do so; the Iraqi army had been weakened by the 
brief war, Shiites in southern Iraq were also fighting back against the beleaguered government 
forces, and the U.S. had encouraged Iraqis to rise up against the Hussein regime during the Gulf 
War.126 However, the Kurdish and Shiite forces were not able to make much headway, even 
against the weakened Iraqi government forces. The Kurds were plainly outmatched by Iraqi 
helicopters and heavy weaponry. The U.S. wavered on whether or not to intervene; on one hand, 
the U.S. had encouraged the revolt, had previously ignored the plight of the Kurds and had 
occasionally relied on Iraqi Kurds as allies in the region, but on the other hand, Americans did 
not want to become involved in a complicated Iraqi civil war.127 As the U.S. wavered on 
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intervention, roughly two million Kurds fled Iraq, heading north into Iraq’s mountainous border 
region with Turkey. Lieutenant Colonel Ronald J. Brown commented that “for [the Kurds], to 
flee provided the only hope for survival.”128  As the number of refugees mounted, the Turkish 
government shut its borders, fearing that an influx of Kurds would stoke minority sentiment in 
their own country, in addition to creating a significant financial burden.129 The result was 
millions of Kurds stranded in the frigid mountains of northern Iraq, fearing a return home, but 
left largely without options. During this period of limbo, many Kurds died from exposure and 
malnutrition.130 
The United States faced a serious humanitarian crisis for which it felt partly responsible. 
McQueen argues that the eventual intervention was due in part to, “pressure on states to adhere 
to the values that they themselves had espoused.”131 Additionally, the ‘CNN effect’ on American 
citizens began to popularize the idea of intervention, as television news played heartbreaking 
segments on the plight of the Kurds in the Karakoram. U.S. officials also feared looking weak by 
not responding to a brutal rebellion in the country the U.S. had just defeated.132 The UN Security 
Council, “adopted Resolution 688... condemning the repression of the Iraqi civilian population… 
and insisting that Iraq allow immediate access by international humanitarian organizations,” on 
April 5, 1991.133  A few weeks later, on April 16th, President Bush declared an Air Force 
operation to supply the Kurds with blankets, food, and other humanitarian supplies, beginning 
Operation Provide Comfort.134 The first stage of the plan was to provide emergency relief, and 
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the second was to provide sustained humanitarian aid with the help of fellow Joint Task Force 
(JTF) members England, Germany, France, and Italy. The JTF was notably comprised of 
members of Desert Storm’s multinational coalition.   
Operation Provide Comfort first had to find the refugees; they were scattered across wide 
swaths of remote, inhospitable terrain. The task force identified twelve major camps in the 
mountainous region, each full of tens of thousands of individuals in desperate need of food, 
clothing, and medical supplies. Sections of the JTF went to work providing assistance to these 
camps, while other forces encouraged Kurds to move to the mountain camps, so they could have 
access to the resources there. This process, referred to as ‘temporary resettlement,’ was 
undertaken to facilitate the provision of aid and security to the Kurds.135  
Executing the second part of the plan, creating a system to provide sustained 
humanitarian aid, involved, “[moving] the Kurds from the mountain camps and [resettling] them 
in northern Iraq… General Garner’s JTF Bravo, formed with conventional forces… entered Iraq 
and created a security zone.”136 In the process of moving refugees from the mountain camps to 
the newly constructed camps in a security area in northern Iraq, it became clear that many 
wished to simply return home, “regardless of the condition.”137 About a third of the refugees 
were from the nearby northern Iraq town of Duhok, which was under Iraqi control.  The JTF 
eventually mounted an operation and took Duhok back. Following the fight, the JTF rebuilt key 
infrastructure in the city to ensure that it could receive and sustain the refugees.138 The security 
area eventually became a 10,000 square kilometer area of northern Iraq, protected by JTF 
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airpower’s maintenance of a no-fly zone above the country’s 36th parallel.139  It is also valuable 
to note that the Peshmerga worked in concert with JTF forces. Gordon Rudd writes that “[the 
JTF] developed a cooperative relationship with [the Peshmerga], making use of their 
capabilities.”140 While the Peshmerga had not been strong enough to beat the Iraqi army outright, 
the Peshmerga helped bolster JTF forces. More importantly, the force ensured that a military 
presence continued to exist in northern Iraq following the withdrawal of JTF forces. 
Once the refugees were resettled in the security area, the JTF began the process of 
leaving Iraq, handing over humanitarian efforts to the UNHCR and NGOs.141 While these 
agencies were capable of taking over the relief aspects of Operation Provide Comfort, the UN 
initially refused to provide peacekeeping forces to maintain the security of northern Iraq.142 The 
UN eventually reached a diplomatic agreement with the Iraqi government that allowed UN 
‘security police’ to protect UNHCR and NGO facilities, though the UN did not have adequate 
staff to fill those roles, so it cobbled together a mixture of UN staffers and individual contractors 
from private relief organizations.143 A transition period ensuring the ability of UN security police 
and the Peshmerga to protect the area was coupled with negotiations with the Iraqi government. 
In these negotiations, JTF officials stressed that the “Combined Brigade Task Force was on full 
alert and ready to reenter Iraq.” 144 This move was aimed at deterring aggressive actions by the 
Iraqi military following JTF withdrawal. There were also explicit contingency plans in place for 
potential conflict, and JTF air power continued regular daily flights in and around the no-fly zone 
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above northern Iraq.145 The transition ultimately proved successful, and the Kurds were left 
mostly alone in northern Iraq. Over the following decades, bolstered by the deposition of 
Hussein, the Iraq War, and ISIS’s invasion, the Kurds have continued to expand their military 
and oil infrastructure, growing wealthier and more powerful. 
Operation Provide Comfort was successful in achieving both its short-term goal of 
stabilization and its long-term goal of providing humanitarian aid and eventually transitioning 
peacefully to a new status quo for the region.  It is important to note that, “throughout the most 
demanding phases... the coalition [provided] the command and control, as well as the security, 
airlift, and logistics needed to care for and resettle the refugees in northern Iraq.”146 The success 
of the mission required coordination across a multinational coalition, including air power, ground 
forces, and humanitarian branches aimed at providing food, shelter, and medical attention. Some 
operations, such as retaking Dohuk, required all three of these groups to work together closely. 
Not only did the JTF achieve these military goals and create a successful security area, but it 
planned and executed a successful transition of power to the UNHCR and NGOs. 
Analysis  
McQueen writes that “the safe haven in northern Iraq was… successful… it provided 
adequate security, and sustenance for the Kurds within their country of origin; it successfully 
deterred through troops and air power any reprisals from Saddam Hussein; and it retained 
sufficient international support to avoid the fracturing of the 1991 Gulf War coalition.”147 
Ultimately, Operation Provide Comfort is a clear example of a successfully implemented safe 
zone. It protected hundreds of thousands of Kurds from the Iraqi army, moved them to physically 
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safe locations, and transitioned power back to the Iraqi Kurds without incident. However, the 
circumstances that allowed the JTF to implement the safe zone in this successful manner are 
specific and not reproducible, at least as a sustainable framework for humanitarian intervention.   
 The actors involved, primarily the United States, had decent levels of interest in 
instituting a safe zone to help the Iraqi Kurds. The US was not motivated solely by a sense of 
responsibility for the role it played previously in the oppression of the Kurds, nor by the fact that 
it had supported the Kurdish rebellion. The US was also driven by a desire to secure stability for 
the region as a whole to help allies in the area, and using a no-fly zone to protect the safe area 
additionally allowed U.S. Air Force personnel to spy on the Iraqi government.148 Other leading 
coalition members also had interests that aligned with intervention. British Prime Minister John 
Major sought to establish himself as an equal to his martial predecessor, Margaret Thatcher. The 
French, in the face of growing international irrelevance, wanted to signal their continued 
importance on the world stage.149 None of these interests, however, seem large enough to 
motivate these nations to risk the lives of their soldiers in executing the safe zone. These interests 
would inform a level of willingness to become involved in the conflict, but with each of these 
states lacking a serious security interest in the region and the Iraqi Kurds, that willingness would 
not be large enough to surmount the practical challenges of the situation.   
If the interests of the states involved were low, and willingness was accordingly not 
commensurate with the challenges of implementing the safe zone, how was Operation Provide 
Comfort successful? The answer lies in the fact that these nations did not have to have a level of 
willingness high enough to surmount the practical challenges that generally accompany safe 
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areas. Most of the practical challenges that needed to be addressed with the safe zone in northern 
Iraq had already been surmounted by Desert Storm. All of the aspects that needed to be 
considered and organized to undertake the humanitarian relief mission had already been executed 
for the military operation conducted against Iraq. The interests and willingness of the actors only 
had to be large enough to surmount the very low cost of implementing Operation Provide 
Comfort. The actors did not have to gather, arm, or coordinate forces. Additionally, and very 
notably, the cost of implementing the safe zone did not involve a large risk of danger for JTF 
troops. The JTF had already clearly shown its ability to mount military operations and inflict 
harm against Iraq. Those reassurances allowed the JTF to feel fairly confident that it would not 
receive much pushback from the Iraqi army. Ultimately, the practical challenges and possible 
costs of the intervention, both financial and in terms of loss of life, were very low. Because these 
obstacles were uniquely small, the marginal interests of the actors created enough willingness to 
surmount these challenges.  
 It is also important to note that, because of Desert Storm, the JTF was able to largely 
ignore the concepts of impartiality and neutrality. It was already clear and established that the 
JTF was not a neutral and impartial force. Its position as both relatively insulated from danger, 
and also capable of responding to it, additionally did not incentivize it to hide behind the tenets 
of impartiality and neutrality. Since the JTF was neither constrained by the ideals of impartiality 
and neutrality nor could JTF soldiers use those tenets to justify inaction, the implementation of 
the safe area was well-coordinated and successful. Ultimately, impartiality and neutrality either 
constrain the tools at an intervening actor’s disposal, making the task at hand more difficult, or 
the tenets provide cover for intervening forces to make decisions prioritizing their safety over the 
safety of the group they have intervened to protect. Because of the unique situation of the JTF 
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during Operation Provide Comfort, these complicating considerations played no role in the 
mission.    
Another aspect that aided the success of the mission was the fact that the soldiers 
involved in the multinational coalition reported directly to their normal military superiors, who 
coordinated amongst themselves and their nations at a higher level. While these soldiers were at 
a disconnect to the people they were protecting, similar to the peacekeepers considered during 
the Bosnia case study, the soldiers were operating within their normal military framework. 
Additionally, the JTF was comprised of the same forces that had bolstered the US military during 
Desert Storm. All of the logistical problems of coordinating with forces across countries had 
already been sorted out prior to the Gulf War. McQueen writes that:  
the multilateral pursuit of community interests throughout the Gulf Conflict period 
later facilitated from an instrumental perspective the adoption of a safety zone approach… the 
channels of communication developed during the hostilities with Iraq remained in place and 
eased decision-making about how to proceed with the safe haven policy. The military activities 
of the three contributors, the US, Britain and France, were easily coordinated, so the safe 
haven was mounted effectively in record time. As the costs and tasks of the operation were 
spread  among 30 states, no one state bore too great a burden.150     
 
In short, the unique situation of the Gulf War preceding the implementation of the safe area in 
northern Iraq positioned the multinational force remarkably well to undertake its task. Not only 
were all aspects of interoperability already established and tested, but the burden of funding was 
distributed across numerous actors.   
 Additionally, in terms of the success of the operational aspects of the safe zone, the 
physical task was not particularly difficult. The hardest part was physically finding Kurds in the 
widespread, remote area. The JTF did not have to worry about distinguishing between groups of 
individuals or making moral decisions regarding which individuals would be allowed entrance 
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into safe areas. Northern Iraq already was inhabited almost entirely by Kurds, so the forces only 
needed to find them. This concentration of the Kurds also made it easier to create and protect the 
safe zone; a hard barrier and no-fly zone at the 36th parallel was the clear option. The forces did 
not have to worry about a safe area surrounded on all sides by belligerents. Instead, there was a 
clear barrier to protect, and all other borders of the safe area were with other countries. 
 It is also valuable to note that the movement of individuals is less problematic in this case 
study than in the previous discussion of Srebrenica. While Operation Provide Comfort did 
involve the physical movement of people into camps, it was with the express purpose of 
providing aid more effectively. There was an undeniable interest on the part of the JTF to keep 
the Kurds in Iraq to avoid destabilizing the region, but the JTF also had legitimate and practical 
humanitarian intentions in gathering Kurds. Once the Kurds were gathered and resettled in 
camps, they were given aid and support by JTF forces in ways that would not have been possible 
if Kurds remained spread across a large and mountainous geographic area. The retaking of 
Dohuk further ensured that the safe area included a town with appropriate urban facilities to 
render aid.  Additionally, “without including Dohuk in the security zone there wouldn’t be 
enough of a populated area with urban facilities to get the Kurds moving back.”151 While it 
aligned with the interests of the intervening actor to keep the Kurds in northern Iraq, the JTF also 
expended a large amount of energy to ensure that the Kurds were protected and comfortable.  
Overall, the JTF’s actions demonstrate a genuine humanitarian concern and a commitment to 
helping the Kurds rebuild and maintain a community.  
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As interest and willingness were great enough to meet the challenges of safe zones in this 
case, the proposed method would generally conclude that moral hazard played no role in 
Operation Provide Comfort. McQueen, however, suggests that there was a moral hazard 
problem. She identifies moral hazard in the events following JTF withdrawal from Iraq. 
McQueen finds problems with the lack of serious diplomatic talks at the end of Operation 
Provide Comfort which could have clearly established northern Iraq as autonomous or pursued 
its reintegration into Iraq. Rather than resolving these questions, the ability to pass off 
responsibility to the UN and NGOs created a moral hazard for the JTF. She critiques that, 
“[Operation Provide Comfort’s] one significant drawback was that its implementation was not 
linked to a broader solution to the Iraqi problem; the coalition that established it was eager to 
withdraw, so no clear provisions were put in place to reintegrate the safe haven and its 
surroundings into Iraq or to clarify the area’s status generally beyond autonomy in a de facto 
sense.”152 However, there are serious problems with McQueen’s argument. First, the idea that 
northern Iraq could have been reintegrated into Iraq in a successful manner that ensured the 
continued safety of the Kurds is ridiculous; Iraqi history provided a clear roadmap to show that 
this eventuality was virtually impossible, and as such, would have been irresponsible for the JTF 
to pursue. Second, the likelihood that Iraq would have willingly agreed to the secession of 
northern Iraq is nonexistent. It is not reasonable to expect that the JTF would have been willing 
to force Iraq’s hand militarily or with serious political action. The JTF had neither the interest 
nor the will to pursue the conflict beyond ensuring the safety of Iraqi Kurds. Additionally, as the 
end of Operation Provide Comfort unfolded, the JTF did help train the Peshmerga and maintain 
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the no-fly zone. At the very least, these actions allowed Iraqi Kurds the time and space necessary 
to rebuild and train their own military so that they could later take on their own defense.  
The circumstances that led to the success of the safe zone in Iraqi Kurdistan were so 
specific and fortuitous that they are unlikely to be reproduced in humanitarian crises in the 
coming decades. However, in discussing the success of Operation Provide Comfort, it needs to 
be clear that the JTF did not succeed because it recognized the shortcomings of humanitarian 
intervention and changed their plans accordingly. Operation Provide Comfort was a successful 
intervention because external, irreproducible factors aligned the JTF’s low level of interests and 
willingness with low practical challenges. This intervention avoided the classic trap of lack of 
interest, low willingness, moral hazard, and poor outcome purely coincidentally. It is clear that 
the success of Operation Provide Comfort was due to these lucky circumstances and not a larger 
understanding of the problems inherent to humanitarian intervention. This fact is clear in how the 
JTF handled its withdrawal from northern Iraq.  The UN ‘security police’ and cobbled-together 
staff left in northern Iraq were entirely incapable of defending the safe area and had less interest 
and willingness to do so than the JTF. Northern Iraq only continued to be safe because of the 
credible threat of US retaliation if Iraq violated the no-fly zone and the additional deterrent of the 
Peshmerga. While it is important to look at this successful case of humanitarian intervention to 
see what conditions allowed the policy to be implemented effectively, it is also vitally important 
to note that almost all of those conditions were coincidental and unique to this situation.  
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Case Study: Operation Turquoise, Rwanda 
History  
The 1994 genocide in Rwanda was one of the most horrifying events of modern times. In 
a matter of months, over 800,000 Rwandans, mostly of the Tutsi ethnic group, were killed, and 
over two million Rwandans, mostly of the Hutu ethnic group, fled the country.153 The 
international community’s relative lack of intervention and the role of colonialism in creating the 
ethnic tensions within the nation characterize the Rwandan genocide. 
 Rwanda is “one of the few African countries with only two significant ethnic groups, 
with Hutus (85%) and Tutsis (14%) accounting for most of the population.”154 When Germany 
colonized the nation in 1895, it supported the existing Tutsi monarchy, and after Rwanda shifted 
hands to Belgium following WWI, the Tutsis continued to be the favored group. The Belgian 
government supported Tutsis over Hutus as the group in power because of the Hamitic 
hypothesis that “African ‘civilization’ was due to racially distinct Caucasoid invaders from the 
north/northeast of Africa.”155 The notion that Tutsis were Hamites was based on the observations 
of German and Belgian colonial officials noting that since “[Tutsis] ruled over a majority, they 
‘must’ possess incongruous martial skill and intelligence, which, combined with the observation 
that the Tutsi… possessed a different physiology to that of the Hutu, was taken to indicate Tutsi 
provenance outside of Rwanda.”156 Essentially, the Belgians supported the Tutsi minority as the 
main governing group because they believed them to be more Caucasian. The Belgian 
government began a policy of Tutsification, instituting a system of Tutsi-led chiefdoms, 
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mandatory ethnic identity cards, elite schools only for Tutsis, and new laws to oppress Hutus.157 
It is also important to note that another motivation likely played into the decisions the Belgians 
made as colonizers. A common method of ruling colonies during that time period was ‘divide 
and rule,’ which Richard Morrock defines in his essay, Heritage of Strife: The Effects of 
Colonialist "Divide and Rule" Strategy upon the Colonized Peoples, as, “ the conscious effort of 
an imperialist power to create and/or turn to its own advantage the ethnic, linguistic, cultural, 
tribal, or religious differences within the population of a subjugated colony.”158 Favoring a 
minority granted a cohesive identity and social position to a small portion of the population; by 
far the majority of the population remained scattered, disenfranchised, and without resources, 
bolstering the power of the Belgians.   
  A 1961 coup eventually established a Hutu-led government, which, over time, led to 
discrimination against Tutsis, including rules that allocated government funds and resources to 
Tutsis on the basis of their percentage in the population.159 Tensions continued to increase over 
the following years as Tutsi guerilla groups attacked Hutus, eliciting reprisal attacks on Tutsis. 
Tutsis began to flee the country as refugees, and, in 1987, Tutsi exiles in Uganda created the 
Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) with the political goal of returning Tutsi refugees to Rwanda.160  
A series of negotiations to ease tensions between the ethnic groups and create a system of 
government in Rwanda that could support a sustainable peace between Hutus and Tutsis 
collapsed in 1990 when the RPF invaded Rwanda. While the Arusha Peace Agreement, a 
compromise that included most of the RPF’s wishes and the creation of the UN Assistance 
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Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR), ended the conflict in 1993, many Hutus believed it to be too 
generous.161  The tenuous peace quickly began to deteriorate and, “alarming information... 
continued to pour into UNAMIR headquarters.”162 Even the CIA issued a report predicting the 
failure of the Arusha compromise and the beginning of mass violence.163  
On April 6, 1994, President Habyarimana, a Hutu, was assassinated. His plane was shot 
down during landing at the airport in Kigali,164 though it remains unclear whether the mortar was 
launched by Tutsi rebels or Hutu extremists.165 Regardless of the group that initiated the 
assassination, it set the following genocide and civil war (between the Tutsi RPF and Hutu 
Rwandan government forces) into motion as death squads began killing Tutsis and moderate 
Hutus.166 While, in the conflict that followed, most systematic killings took place in areas held 
by the Rwandan government, the RPF also murdered thousands of Hutus, and the dangers of 
fleeing and poor conditions in refugee camps further increased the death toll.167 
The UN, despite UNAMIR’s presence in Rwanda, stayed largely on the sidelines of the 
conflict. On the heels of the spectacular international failure in Somalia, many thought that “to 
repeat the failure... would fatally damage the credibility of the UN.”168 The UN justified its lack 
of action by, “[characterizing] the situation predominantly as a resumed civil war,” between the 
RPF and Rwandan government forces.169 Finally, the Security Council passed Resolution 918 on 
May 17, 1994, calling for an expansion of UNAMIR’s mandate to alleviate the suffering of the 
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Rwandan people, including through “the establishment and maintenance, where feasible, of 
secure humanitarian areas.”170 The Resolution also called for UNAMIR to provide security to 
humanitarian relief shipments, emboldened UNAMIR troops to act in self-defense when 
protected areas or individuals were at risk, and asked for member states to help supply 5,500 
troops to undertake these responsibilities.171 It is important to note that an estimated 200,000-
500,000 of the ultimate 800,000 deaths had already happened by the end of April 1994 when the 
UN passed Resolution 918.172  
The UN, however, was unwilling to actualize the extension of UNAMIR’s mandate, 
despite the passage of Resolution 918. This reluctance eventually opened the door for another 
actor to play a defining role in intervention. It ended up being the French who, in early July, 
established a ‘safe humanitarian zone’ in Rwanda as part of a relief effort named Operation 
Turquoise (OT).173 French Prime Minister Alain Juppé argued that OT would follow the 
guidelines Resolution 918 set forth for UNAMIR. France would essentially fulfill UNAMIR’s 
goals as a temporary proxy. Resolution 929, passed by the Security Council in late June, 
legitimized and reiterated Juppé’s goal by authorizing the French intervention until such a time 
that UNAMIR could fulfill the original mandate put forth by Resolution 918. Resolution 929 
asserted, “the strictly humanitarian character of this operation which shall be conducted in an 
impartial and neutral fashion, and shall not constitute an interposition force between the 
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parties…  [and which supports] the security… of displaced persons, refugees and civilians at 
risk.”174  
Juppé billed OT as a simple moral undertaking, saying, “are there not times where the 
sense of honor and the most elementary morality dictate the taking of risks?”175 However, the 
reality is significantly more complicated. France had been a supporter of the Hutu regime for 
decades; the nation had even signed a military agreement with Hutu strongman and eventual 
president Juvenal Habyarimana in 1975. Habyarimana regularly visited France over his lifetime 
and had a close personal relationship with President Mitterand.176 When France decided to 
launch OT in 1994, it had been supporting Habyarimana’s government against the RPF with 
weapons and tactical support since 1990.177 Some lines of scholarship suggest that French 
motivations underlying support for the Hutu regime were largely sentimental; “France claimed 
Rwanda as a solid member of the Francophone bloc, viewed from Paris as a great family with 
itself as a generous and indulgent parent.”178 In light of these ties, many countries and the RPF 
were wary of allowing France to intervene in the country. Landgren wrote that “the reluctance of 
many governments to see France involved militarily in Rwanda cannot be overstated, however, 
and stemmed from concerns that France’s interest in the situation was not neutral.”179 Skeptics 
even argued that the humanitarian relief effort could be a thinly-veiled French attempt to aid the 
Hutu government in regaining control of the country. 
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In The Limits of Humanitarian Intervention: Genocide in Rwanda, Alan Kuperman notes 
that the motivations surrounding French involvement in the Rwandan genocide is a continued 
debate in international politics and academia. Kuperman argues that, “France’s decision to 
intervene was compelled by French public outcry over continuing reports of anti-Tutsi 
atrocities,” but he recognizes how Human Rights Watch found evidence supporting that, 
“elements within the French defense establishment managed to funnel small amounts of arms 
and advice to the Hutu army from the outbreak of renewed fighting in April 1994… five 
additional arms shipments were sent from France to Rwanda through Zaire in May and June 
1994.”180 Kuperman identifies the ‘elements of the French defense establishment’ to be 
coordinated by a retired French officer on the payroll of the French government, operating out of 
the French embassy in Kigali.181 It is important to note, however, that France did not become 
involved in the conflict until the very end of June, and the safe zone was not established until 
July, so French physical involvement in the conflict was not concurrent to the covert arms 
shipments.   
France argued publicly, however, that its plan had three main aims, all consistent with the 
wishes of the international community. The French aimed first to stop the flow of refugees into 
neighboring countries, both because of the poor humanitarian conditions in the camps, and also 
the possible destabilizing effects of the mass migration. Second, France aimed to fulfill 
UNAMIR’s duty of creating and sustaining a safe humanitarian zone until a ceasefire could be 
reached. Third, France aimed to offer neutral and impartial assistance to those in need.182 
Ultimately, in the face of the UN’s own reluctance to become involved in the conflict, the UN 
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could hardly denounce French plans to provide humanitarian aid in Rwanda, when French public 
aims were so in line with the wishes of the international community. In the absence of an 
organized international response to block France’s efforts, France was allowed to go forward 
with OT.   
The French established a very large safe humanitarian zone in the Cyangugu-Kibuye-
Gikongoro area of southwest Rwanda in late June 1994.183 The forces numbered 2,900 French 
military personnel, 1,200 of whom were combat troops, and they had 100 armed vehicles, 600 
other vehicles, 10 helicopters, and 12 combat aircraft.184 While somewhat well-armed, the forces 
were protecting a swath of land roughly one-fifth the size of Rwanda.185 Additionally, the safe 
zone was established in an area where approximately 1.2 million individuals were already living. 
Some of the individuals in the safe zone were refugees, and some of were citizens of that area; 
the individuals already in the safe zone comprised both Hutus and Tutsis.186 Additionally, 
individuals of all identities, but particularly Hutus, were constantly moving through the safe zone 
as the front of the conflict grew closer to the safe area. As the front pushed west through 
Rwanda, the RPF began winning, and the Hutu government forces were on the defensive.  
The large scope of the safe zone meant that there was less than one troop per square mile 
of the safe zone, and there were 1.5 troops per one thousand individuals in the area.187 Because 
there were so few troops compared to the population living in the safe area, and given the 
acreage of the safe area, it was difficult for the French to find Tutsis. The French forces were 
really only successful in finding and bringing Tutsis to better-protected areas within the safe 
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zone when the Tutsis were gathered in large groups, like the roughly 10,000 Tutsis who, “were 
saved at the stadium in Cyangugu.”188 The French forces were less successful at finding and 
helping Tutsis spread across the large swaths of land in the safe zone because they lacked 
personnel and vehicles, but also because they were afraid of Hutu or Tutsi militia forces hiding 
in the bush.189 The French forces did succeed in gathering surviving Rwandans in the safe zone 
into camps where they could protect them and provide them with aid more effectively, though a 
large number of these surviving Rwandans were Hutu.190 The French allowed Hutus already 
within the safe zone to stay, spanning from civilians to militia members and interim government 
officials, and the soldiers allowed genocidaires and militiamen taking refuge from the 
approaching Tutsi army to enter the safe zone. Notably, allowing all groups of individuals into 
the safe area was technically required by Resolution 929’s call for impartiality and neutrality in 
the execution of the mandate.  
While the French efforts undoubtedly saved lives, allowing the rival ethnic groups to 
occupy the same space led to “several thousand others probably [being] killed in the zone during 
the French occupation. French troops also did not intervene to stop looting or to arrest 
extremists. Lacking the forces, mandate, and interest to serve as a police force, they did not do 
so.”191 While mentions of death and looting exist in other sources such as Mel McNulty’s 
France’s Role in Rwanda and External Military Intervention, no sources offer further 
illumination regarding the looting and death within the safe zone, or numbers to explain its 
scope. This lack of information is likely due to the chaos and brevity of the safe zone, the poor 
documentation of events on the ground during that period, and the sustained French refusal to 
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open its archives regarding OT to the international community. It is likely, however, that there 
was ethnic conflict between Tutsis and Hutus in the safe zone because, as stated, the French 
could not patrol the area effectively. Just as there was widespread murder, looting, and chaos in 
Rwanda as a whole during this time, many of those same characteristics likely also existed in the 
safe zone.   
Ultimately, Operation Turquoise saved an estimated 15,000 to 17,000 Tutsis.192 The RPF 
beat the remaining Rwandan government forces on July 13, 1994, and a new government was 
sworn in on July 19th in Kigali.  The entire French mission to create and maintain a safe zone in 
Rwanda lasted only a number of weeks and notably came after a vast majority of the murders 
had already been committed. When the French left Rwanda in the middle of August, the OT safe 
area was passed to the jurisdiction of UNAMIR, in accordance with Resolution 929, which 
required power to eventually be shifted back to the UN-run force. UNAMIR was likely able to 
finally amass appropriate troop numbers and funding in the wake of the conflict because the 
objective of reconstruction was slightly clearer, and the likelihood of facing danger was 
significantly lower. Additionally, in the wake of such widespread and extreme violence, the 
international community was willing to invest in rebuilding, where it had not been willing to 
invest in aiding one side or the other during the war.  
In the years following the conflict, many of the “the internally displaced were abruptly 
and, in places, violently dispersed out of the former safe zone,” both by the new Tutsi-led 
Rwandan government forces and other remaining militias.193 While the safe zone was under 
UNAMIR’s control during this time, the French left quickly and without a plan to transition 
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individuals from the camps back into society. Rwanda has, however, made a remarkable 
recovery overall in the past three decades.  From 1994, when it was, “desperately poor, without 
skilled labor and resources, and the people demoralized and divided,” to today, unbelievable 
reconciliation and progress have occurred.194 Security and stability efforts coupled with 
international humanitarian relief have helped forge the beginning of a new national identity for 
Rwandans.  
Analysis  
Ultimately, the French safe zone in Rwanda served part of its purpose; it saved roughly 
15,000 Tutsis who otherwise likely would have been killed as part of the genocide. Notably, 
however, the number of individuals who died in the safe zone, either from ethnic violence or 
other forms of violence, is not known. The safe zone was too brief and instituted too late to have 
a larger positive effect. Saving 15,000 lives is remarkable, but the Rwandan genocide saw the 
deaths of hundreds of thousands of Tutsis, most of which occurred in the early stages of the 
genocide, and the French were only involved in humanitarian relief efforts for the last month of a 
three-month conflict. While this short time frame constrained the positive effects the French 
could have, this analysis will address how the short time frame might also have mitigated some 
of the negative effects the safe zone could have had.   
First and foremost, it is important to fully deconstruct interest in this case. It is clear that 
the UN had an interest in the conflict, mainly because the international community expected the 
UN to fulfill its duty in addressing crises such as genocide. Not undertaking such a task, 
especially in the face of widespread international pressure, would likely corrode the legitimacy 
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of the UN. While the UN surely also had a vested interest in the safety and well-being of the 
Rwandan people, the decisions it made as an institution revolved around larger political 
considerations. The UN needed to address the genocide in some fashion, but it was largely 
unwilling to do so in the face of failed humanitarian intervention in Somalia. It is clear that the 
UN was struggling with this problem of interest as it equivocated about the status of the conflict 
in Rwanda in the early stages, shrinking away from calling it a genocide. The UN did not have 
an interest large enough to cobble together forces, arm them, and deploy them with a clear 
objective. The UN did, however, have to at least appear to be addressing the conflict. The French 
desire to intervene accordingly created a moral hazard the United Nations could take advantage 
of. The UN had the opportunity to legitimize French operations under the banner of the UN. The 
UN could legitimize the intervention despite murky French intentions, and ease international 
pressure on the UN to address the conflict itself. If the UN blocked the French intervention and 
then did not become involved itself, it would incur the wrath of the international community. For 
the UN, the answer was simple.  
France had interests in the conflict, though they were purely political. While these 
interests were the main motivating factor for its involvement, they were not particularly intense 
and revolved around the French government’s affinity for the Hutu regime. At the very least, 
“France propped up an increasingly extremist regime, did not use its leverage over the Rwandan 
government to greater positive effect, and failed to take any action to halt the genocide when it 
started.”195 France did not have a broader national security interest in Rwanda, nor an economic 
or military interest. The closest to a strategic interest it could have had in Rwanda was 
supporting a fellow Francophone nation in a world increasingly dominated by Anglophone 
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culture. McQueen argues that “The global dominance of Anglophone language and culture, as 
well as American economic might, came to be seen as threats to France’s state interests.”196 
While France was perhaps propelled into eventual involvement in the conflict by widespread 
public concern for the Tutsis as Kuperman suggests, it is clear that France was not motivated 
only by horror at the genocide. France had a close personal, military, and political relationship 
with the party perpetrating the genocide. 
It is not clear what the goals of French involvement in the Rwandan conflict were, but 
they likely aligned with the type of argument Kuperman puts forth. He argues that, while there 
was a close relationship between the French government and the Hutu interim government, and 
that relationship included arming Hutu militias in the early days of the genocide, “the evidence 
suggests that France had already abandoned any intention of supporting the [Hutu military] in 
northwestern Rwanda by the end of the operation’s first week.”197 The French force entered 
Rwanda through the Hutu stronghold in the northwestern corner of the nation, and continued 
southwest without aiding Hutu forces, “despite pleas from [Hutu militias] and from Rwanda’s 
Hutu government.”198 Additionally, upon entering the country, many French soldiers were 
immediately disillusioned; any affinity the French infantrymen felt for the Hutu vanished when 
they saw the violence levied against the Tutsis.199 It cannot be known what the original aims of 
the French government were, but it is clear from the very beginning of the intervention that the 
French force was not going to actively aid Hutu militias or the Hutu interim government.  
 It is important to look at will in this case to explain the events that took place after this 
original refusal to aid various Hutu forces. Though France had political interests in Rwanda, they 
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were not particularly binding or vital. Its level of interest was inadequate to muster the 
appropriate funding, effort, or coordination necessary to overcome the practical problems of safe 
zone implementation, which were particularly large in Rwanda. The large scope of the safe zone 
meant that there was less than one troop per square mile of the safe zone, and there were 1.5 
troops per one thousand individuals in the area.200 The general rule for military interventions and 
operations is, at a minimum, a troop density of 20 soldiers to every 1,000 individuals.201 It is 
important to note here that there is no information readily available on why the French sent so 
few troops and such improper armaments, especially to establish such a large safe zone in an 
area already home to over a million individuals, not all of whom were civilians, and not all of 
whom were Tutsi. Some lines of scholarship suggest that French soldiers were more improperly 
armed than poorly armed because they had armaments conducive to war fighting instead of 
providing humanitarian aid.202 However, if French intentions were actually martial and revolved 
around aiding the Hutus in regaining power, what would justify the small number of soldiers the 
French sent? While perhaps these assertions could explain the situation with the French 
armaments, they cannot explain the low number of French soldiers. Ultimately, it is likely that 
the small force was due to French political will; that number was all the nation could muster the 
will to send, and perhaps, a year before the events of Bosnia proved how many soldiers were 
truly necessary to protect a safe zone, France convinced itself that such a small number of troops 
would somehow be able to accomplish the task at hand. Indeed, the French suggestion to the UN 
to send a large number of well-armed troops to hold the safe zone in Bosnia occurred after 
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Operation Turquoise. Perhaps France was either ignorant of the true challenges its soldiers would 
face with implementing the safe zone in Rwanda, or it was overcome with hubris that only a 
force of that size was needed to achieve French goals for the conflict.      
The French forces feared violence, and that consideration informed numerous aspects of 
their behavior. They let Hutus into the safe zone and allowed those already within the area to 
stay. The French forces did not stop looting and violence within the safe zone, either amongst 
groups or between them, out of fear that they themselves would face harm. Those fears are 
notably not irrational, coming from forces outnumbered literally one thousand to one. 
Ultimately, the French chose to allow the Hutu government, army, and militias to flee to Zaire as 
a method of keeping relative peace in the safe zone.203 While French actions may have aligned 
with concerns that France would support the Hutus, they also aligned with the very real and 
present threat of violence. Heavily outmanned and outnumbered, the most logical action the 
French could have taken was allowing Hutus into the safe zone and eventually allowing them to 
flee the area. While letting these Hutus flee into Zaire allowed them to avoid revenge killings 
and eventually trials, letting them flee also aided the French in keeping relative peace in a very 
tenuous situation.  
 It is additionally important to discuss how keeping the safe zone open to all individuals 
was justified by the specific mandates of OT, both as set forth in Resolution 929 and by the self-
imposed French mandate. While it may seem absurd that France let Hutu militias and Hutu 
extremist government officials into its safe zone, those actions are required by impartiality and 
neutrality. Expecting French forces to only offer safety to one group would actually undermine 
impartiality and neutrality. It is, however, important to also note that had they had a motive to 
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harbor Hutus, French forces could have done so under the protection of impartiality and 
neutrality. These observations are not meant to argue that French actions were or were not just, 
or that they did or did not follow a mandate, but rather to point out the disparity between 
international legal frameworks and the reality of conflict. The question of impartiality and 
neutrality is interesting in most cases of safe zone usage, but these questions are particularly 
powerful in the context of Rwanda. The specific safe zone implemented during the genocide was 
so strongly plagued by issues of impartiality and neutrality because the group the safe zone was 
created to protect quickly became the dominant group in the conflict. The former aggressor 
group became the target, and large numbers of Hutus were being pushed toward the safe zone by 
the military front.   
 Ultimately, French inability to save more Tutsis either by gathering them in safer areas or 
by policing violence within the safe zone was a failure of the French to actualize their mandate 
as the intervening force.  Had the French had appropriate interests and will to either execute a 
smaller, more effective safe zone, or to have mobilized a larger, better-armed force, they perhaps 
could have avoided these failures. Additionally, with those better resources, perhaps they could 
have repelled fleeing Hutus or stopped Hutus within the safe area from fleeing into Zaire. As it 
played out, however, the French did not have much of a choice but to let them enter and to 
eventually let them flee. To view those acts solely as in line with French affinity toward the Hutu 
regime is to misunderstand the problem at hand; these decisions were made first and foremost 
from a weak tactical position, with survival in mind.  
While the safe zone itself was not a massive failure, it is impossible to know what would 
have happened had the war lasted longer.  If the RPF had not already been winning decisively 
when the French began the safe zone, the conflict could have played out very differently. If the 
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interim government or Hutu militias had been stronger, France’s inability to enforce or police the 
safe zone could have been disastrous. It is additionally unclear what would have happened if the 
Hutu extremists won the conflict, and France was in control of a concentrated group of Tutsis. 
While it is not valuable to consider hypotheticals with the goal of actually reaching answers, the 
aim of posing these questions is to emphasize how treacherous the situation in Rwanda was, and, 
in a broader sense, how treacherous it is to create safe zones without well-armed, appropriately 
manned groups protecting them. Ultimately, not only do safe zone have a slew of practical and 
structural problems associated with them, but they can create a large moral hazard for the 
international community in addition to the intervening body. The system is such that the UN 
legitimized the intervention of an actor with potentially nefarious motives. 
Lastly, it is important to note two aspects of the Rwandan genocide to offer a full picture 
of the conflict. The first is that, underlying the success of Rwanda’s post-conflict nation-
building, old wounds still fester. In December of 2017, the Rwandan government released a 
report naming France complicit in the genocide.204 The report states, “that French military forces 
trained their Rwandan counterparts, supplied them with weapons even after an arms embargo, 
and gave cover, under the auspices of a United Nations-sanctioned humanitarian mission, in the 
last moments of a genocidal campaign.”205 In 2009, Rwanda announced, “an ambitious plan to 
switch the entire education system to English and effectively purge the country of French as it is 
forced out of the workings of government.”206 Notably, in April 2019, French President 
Emmanuel Macron made the groundbreaking decision to call for a report on French involvement 
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in the genocide, relying on previously sealed French archives.207 This report, however, is 
scheduled to take two years to pull together, and there should be suspicion amongst the 
international community as to whether the final report is sanitized or tempered. If President 
Macron truly had nothing to hide, and was either not afraid of what French archives would 
reveal, or was willing to own up to whatever material is within them, he would have made the 
archives open to Rwandan researchers.  
Second, it is important to acknowledge and discuss the fact that sexual assault against 
local women (and likely men) by French forces was a prominent aspect of Operation Turquoise, 
as “numerous reports cite French soldiers trading sexual favors for food and medical supplies, 
[and] raping… Rwandan civilians.” 208 This aspect of the conflict is vital to note because sexual 
violence is oftentimes forgotten in narratives of conflict and suffering, but it is a traumatic and 
dehumanizing form of assault that needs to be discussed. Additionally, the rape of Rwandan 
civilians shows an important problem with safe zones and humanitarian intervention in general; 
there is no one policing the police force. An intervening third party can essentially act with 
impunity. The parties involved in a conflict are likely too busy to begin fighting an intervening 
force or are incapable of doing so, and the international community is unlikely to respond in any 
way other than condemnation, and even then, it would likely only do so after the conflict ended. 
Ultimately, an intervening party has a position of power and freedom from the consequences of 
abusing it.  
 
                                                 
207 Angelique Chrisafis, “Macron asks experts to investigate French role in Rwandan genocide,” The Guardian, 
April 5, 2019, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/apr/05/macron-asks-experts-investigate-french-role-
rwandan-genocide. 
208 Ross Conroy, “Assessment of Operation Turquoise: The Paradoxical French-led Military Intervention During the 
1994 Genocide in Rwanda,” Real Clear Defense, March 14, 2018, 
https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2018/05/14/assessment_of_opration_turquoise_113440.html. 
  
 
 74 
Case Study: Syrian Civil War 
History 
The civil war in Syria, now in its eighth year, is one of the most complicated and 
devastating conflicts of modern time. The complexity includes both the domestic actors, and also 
global powers including the U.S., Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Russia, Iran, and terrorist organizations, 
all with different ideologies and goals. At this point in time, the conflict has claimed the lives of 
465,000 Syrians, and over twelve million citizens, roughly half of the population, have been 
displaced.209 
 The roots of the current civil war are found in the Arab Spring. Beginning in 2011, 
protests in Tunisia and later Egypt eventually ousted autocratic regimes. In the wake of such 
success in these two nations, citizens in counties across northern Africa and the Middle East took 
to the streets, hoping that similar protests could force democratic change in their own 
communities. In March of 2011, thousands of Syrians began protesting the arrests of several 
young boys who had been caught graffitiing in support of the Arab Spring; one of them, only 
thirteen years old, died after brutal torture.210  While Syrians were specifically protesting the 
treatment of the boys, they were also protesting their autocratic president, Bashar al-Assad, and 
the general oppressive nature of the Syrian government. Not only was the political situation in 
Syria dictatorial, but Assad and most government officials were of the Alawite minority group, a 
branch of Shia Islam, while the majority of citizens in Syria were Sunni Muslims.211  In addition 
to the Arab Spring, a number of external factors also likely played a role in sparking the protests. 
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Widespread drought, attributed by many to climate change, had plagued the nation for over three 
years, forcing millions of citizens into urban population centers, fueling the general sense of 
discontent.212 
 Where similar outpourings of public discontent had forced governmental change in 
Tunisia and Egypt, Assad responded to the protests in Syria by, “by killing hundreds of 
demonstrators and imprisoning many more.”213  While the protests and movements in Tunisia 
and Egypt had not been entirely peaceful, the brutality of the Assad regime was severe. In late 
July, following months of violence perpetrated by the Assad regime against the people, the 
Syrian army defected from the government, forming the Free Syrian Army.214 The civil war truly 
began in the summer of 2011 between the Syrian government and the Free Syrian Army. The 
following months were plagued with fighting that did not seem to be going anywhere. According 
to Samer Abboud in Syria, “The militarization of the uprising— and the subsequent inability of 
the political or military opposition to overthrow the regime— led to the dramatic expansion of 
violence, the proliferation of different armed groups, and the territorial fragmentation of the 
country.”215 
 In the face of growing violence and brutality, both between the Free Syrian Army and the 
Assad regime, but also leveled against innocents in population centers where fighting was taking 
place, concern began to grow the international community.  France and Russia denounced, “the 
growing carnage,” the Arab League suspended Syria’s membership, and the U.S. sanctioned the 
nation, citing human rights abuses.216 In early January 2012, an al-Qaeda offshoot called Jabhat 
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al-Nusra announced their entrance into the conflict in opposition to Assad, beginning the 
involvement of terrorist groups in the conflict.217 This shift allowed the Assad regime to frame 
their brutal attacks as fighting extremism, which additionally allowed the Syrian government to 
group all rebel factions together as radical terrorist groups.218 Violence continued mounting and 
spreading across Syria throughout 2012, fueled by a new influx of weapons.219 A number of 
ceasefires, including one organized by Kofi Annan and approved the UN Security Council, were 
implemented in response to the brutality of the conflict, but all of them quickly failed.220 U.S. 
President Obama, increasingly concerned that a desperate Assad would turn to even more 
horrifying military tactics, issued the famous ‘red line,’ in the same year, stating that Assad’s use 
of chemical weapons would be the final tipping point for American entrance into the conflict.221 
It is also important to note that, amidst the mounting violence, the number of Syrians fleeing the 
nation, namely into bordering Turkey, Lebanon, and Jordan, though also to European nations and 
other countries across the globe, began to increase heavily.  
 During the early days of the revolution, it became clear that opposition groups 
(interchangeably referred to as rebel groups) were varied and disorganized. They spanned 
Marxist groups, pan-Arab groups, democratic groups, Kurdish fighters, terrorist organizations, 
and larger, more legitimate groups such as the Free Syrian Army. It falls outside of the scope of 
this paper to consider all of the rebel groups and their motivations, but it is valuable to note that 
in the early years of the conflict, “Polyglot opposition groups formed, making them difficult to 
distinguish between… the anti-Assad opposition suffered from a lack of both unity and 
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purpose.”222  The constant fracturing and infighting amongst rebel groups also made it difficult 
for the international community to support the opposition; it was unclear which group or groups 
to support, or if any one group could be successful in such a splintered field.  In the midst of this 
conflict in 2014, a new party came to the fore in Iraq and in the Syrian civil war: ISIS 
(interchangeably referred to as IS and ISIL). While the Islamic State, led by Abu Bakr al-
Baghdadi, posed a significant threat to Assad, it also posed a significant threat to every other 
party in the conflict, to the Iraqi government, and to many actors in the international order. IS 
quickly took control of parts of central Syria, and large territories in Iraq; though it started as an 
al-Qaeda splinter group, the ultimate goal of IS was to create a caliphate across Syria and Iraq, 
and even beyond.  By 2015, it was becoming increasingly unclear who was fighting for what 
objective, because the original conflict between Assad and the rebels had mushroomed into a 
conflict mired in complicated alliances and a fight against extremism. The Syrian Observatory on 
Human Rights reported that, by February 2015, 200,000 individuals had died, 28,277 of whom 
had been killed in shootings or mass executions, and a further 18,866 civilians had died in 
government air strikes.223 Syria, a once moderately wealthy country, was mired in poverty, and 
in many places, food and medicine had become scarce. Roughly four million Syrians were 
external refugees, namely in neighboring countries, including nearly 2.2 million in Turkey.224  
 By 2015, roughly a year after IS’s entrance into the conflict, most of the main players in 
the Syrian civil war had solidified. The civil war in Syria additionally became an international 
proxy war built on powers struggles, alliances, and an age-old conflict between the Sunni and 
Shia branches of Islam. Turkey, for example, “has a long, porous border with Syria,” and has 
                                                 
222 Sorenson, Ruins, 37. 
223 Sorenson, Ruins, 43. 
224 Sorenson, Ruins, 44. 
  
 
 78 
denounced Assad’s violence since the beginning because of the economic and political toll that 
Syrian refugees have on Turkey.225 Turkey, a Sunni majority nation, is additionally inclined to 
oppose Assad’s regime on religious grounds. In terms of the fight against extremism, while 
Turkey did not originally have a stake in fighting terrorism within Syria, the nation increased 
cooperation with the U.S. to fight IS after an Islamic State suicide bombing in the Turkish city of 
Suruc.226 At the same time that Turkey was increasing cooperation with U.S. forces, it stopped 
coordinating with the People’s Protection Units (YPG)− a militia comprised of Kurds from 
across the Middle East. Turkey stopped this coordination even though the YPG is aligned with 
Turkey in fighting both Assad and IS.227 Turkey cut ties with this possibly valuable ally because 
the Turkish government opposes the Kurds on ethnic and political grounds. Turkey has 
domestically battled the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) for decades and believes there are ties 
between the PKK and the YPG.228 Turkey has even carried out bombing campaigns against 
Kurdish forces in Syria as they continue fighting against IS and Assad.229  While Turkey entered 
the conflict out of opposition to Assad on religious and practical grounds, its interest has grown 
to include counterterrorism considerations, both in terms of IS and the perceived threats from 
Kurdish militias. 
 The U.S., mired in the lingering effects of the economic meltdown, and still entrenched in 
Iraq Syndrome, was reluctant to become involved, and notably remained so even after Assad 
crossed Obama’s ‘red line’ of chemical weapons use.  The U.S. sought to arm and support 
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moderate rebel groups against Assad’s brutal regime, but with the increasing splintering of the 
opposition, America remained peripherally involved.230 It was not until the rise of IS and the 
entrance of foes like Iran and Russia to the conflict that the U.S. had a serious interest in 
becoming involved. These interests span countering Russian and Iranian influence globally, and 
counterterrorism objectives, in addition to the U.S.’s original anti-Assad interest. To achieve 
these objectives, the U.S. has doubled down on funneling arms and monetary support to allies 
battling IS in the nation, namely Kurdish forces and the YPG in particular, putting Turkey and 
the U.S. at odds with each other despite the fact they are aligned in battling IS and opposing 
Assad.231 
Iran is a close Syrian ally due to its Shia majority and a “culture that includes a self-
identified global responsibility to protect the interest of Middle Eastern Shia communities.”232 
Iran also has vested interests in asserting its power in the region, particularly in relation to Sunni 
Saudi Arabia, and in countering Western influence or ‘westtoxification’ in the area.233 This idea 
of westtoxification relates mainly to the United States which, in addition to playing various 
active roles in the region and pursuing a strong relationship with Saudi Arabia, has a long and 
tense background with Iran. Iran also has an interest in ensuring that Syria remains an area 
through which it can easily funnel resources to the Shia Hezbollah in Lebanon.234 Iran began 
supporting the Assad regime early in the conflict for a confluence of these reasons; the nation 
sent funding and weapons to Syria, and additionally, “sent in experienced Iranian militia 
members both to train Syrian units and to engage the armed opposition.”235 In Syria in Ruins: 
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The Dynamics of the Syrian Civil War, David Sorenson argues that it was Iranian aid and 
involvement in the conflict, more than any other pro-Assad actor, that helped the Syrian 
government forces recover from a tough position during the first few years of the conflict.  
Sorensen asserts that Iran has been able to have a strong effect on the conflict because of its 
“expertise, experience, and strategic patience.”236 
Russia has an old relationship with Syria that started when the USSR began channeling 
money into the nation to counter U.S. power in the Middle East. Russia initially responded to the 
civil war in Syria with ambivalence; it called for an end to the conflict and even worked with the 
U.S. to stop chemical weapons usage.237 In June 2015, however, Putin clarified Russia’s stance, 
pledging Russian support for the Assad regime, and ramping up military assistance.238 Russia 
decided to more actively support the Syrian government for a variety of reasons: first, Russia 
fears that a defeated Assad could lead to a Syrian failed state; second, Russia needs a friend in 
Syria to ensure continued Russian access to its leased port on the Syrian coast; third, supporting 
Syria allows Russia to assert power directly against the U.S. and NATO.239 Sorenson argues that 
“this is the most important Russian power projection in the region in decades, and it will enhance 
Russia’s influence throughout the Levant.”240 Russia also naturally has an interest in combating 
IS, partially because it fears an eventual increased terrorist presence in the Caucuses, but 
combating the rise and spread of terrorism in the Middle East is not the strongest motivation 
behind Russia’s involvement in the civil war.241   
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Saudi Arabia is involved in the conflict first and foremost to counter Iranian power. Saudi 
Arabia, a Sunni majority nation, opposes the Shia Iranian regime, “arguing that its propagation 
of Shia Islam through its self-proclaimed Islamic Revolution [is] a threat to global Islam and that 
[it has] a duty to challenge Iranian influence everywhere.”242 Saudi Arabia has heavily funded 
opposition groups since the beginning of the conflict, while additionally supporting Houthi 
rebels in Yemen, where the civil war has become yet another proxy conflict between Iran and 
Saudi Arabia in the region.243  
Israel is involved in the conflict in Syria mainly to push back against Iranian power and 
the threat that Hezbollah poses to Israeli security and stability.  Israel also has a marginal interest 
in countering IS, as IS, “constantly [uses] the word ‘Jews’ in its list of the enemies it [promises] 
to attack,” though Iran and the Hezbollah present more immediate threats to Israel.244 In early 
2013, Israel had already strategically bombed targets in Syria. One incident, a bombing in 
Damascus, targeted an Iranian general researching chemical weapons. Notably, Israel has not 
taken much of a stance on the Assad regime itself, despite having beaten Syria in no fewer than 
four wars.245   
Hezbollah is a Lebanese militia that was “founded in the early 1980s after Israeli forces 
invaded Lebanon to attack Palestinian Liberation Organization forces.”246 Hezbollah’s influence 
inside of Lebanon continued to grow over the following years, giving voice to the oppressed Shia 
population within the country. As its power as a Shia militia and political entity grew, so did its 
relationship with Shia Iran. Hezbollah now has a strong relationship with Iran, which has helped 
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Hezbollah grow its military capacity, to the point that, “[Hezbollah] can… be understood as an 
extension of Iranian security policy, poised to support Iranian regional aspirations, which have 
included support for the Assad regime.”247 Hezbollah has an interest in the conflict because of its 
Shia roots and relationship with Iran, and also because involvement allows the group to assert 
power against Israel. This anti-Israeli motive is evident in the moves of both Hezbollah and Iran 
to establish positions in the Golan region of Syria, where the nation borders Israel.248 
The interests of European nations, in addition to general humanitarian concern, align with 
U.S. interests in most ways. Europe has a vested interest in fighting IS to stop the rise of global 
terrorism and it additionally benefits from countering Russian influence and power. Europe 
would also, however, greatly gain from stopping or stemming the flow of migrants from Syria, as 
the refugee crisis has greatly affected European political stability.  
Kurdish militias also play an important role in the war in Syria. At the beginning of the 
war, the Kurdish militias formed in a way similar to most rebel groups. These militias were 
mobilized by the opportunity to assert their identity, which had been oppressed by Assad’s 
regime to the point where Kurdish political parties had been banned since the 1970s.249 
Following the outbreak of the civil war, Kurdish militias established several “predominantly 
Kurdish regions, home to roughly two million Kurds,” within Syria.250 Kurdish militias, 
primarily the YPG, later joined forces with the U.S. coalition to battle IS, motivated to win back 
IS-occupied Kurdish territory. The main goal of the Kurds, however, is not extinguishing IS, but 
rather regaining Kurdish territory. Kurdish officials in Syria argue that their ultimate goal is 
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regional autonomy for Kurds in Syria. In this vein, though the Assad government persecuted the 
Kurds prior to the war, the two groups have stayed largely out of each other’s way. A YPG 
commander even told Reuters that the group would not protest Assad’s regime if he agreed to 
respect Kurdish autonomy within their territories.  
 The main interest of the Syrian government, and Assad at its helm, is simply to survive. 
All of the individual actors it has let join the conflict or even asked to join the conflict, are 
strategic allies to help the Syrian government win. Additionally, though the Syrian government 
maintains dislike of the Kurds as an ethnic group, it has aided Kurdish fighters in their conflict 
with Turkey, allowing them to pass freely through government-held territories.251 While Syria 
seems willing to work with the Kurds in service of this shared anti-Turkey objective, the Syrian 
government remains reluctant to agree to the autonomy of Kurdish regions.252 The Syrian 
government has also ruthlessly profited from ISIS’s entrance into the conflict; Assad knows that 
the international community prioritizes beating ISIS over ending his regime and that if it were to 
come to it, the international community would choose Assad over the Islamic State. Secure in 
that knowledge, Assad has stood back and allowed the international community and opposition 
to battle ISIS, expending precious resources and willpower. The Syrian regime, in contrast, 
continues trade with IS-held areas, mainly as it relates to oil.253  It is also important to reiterate 
the lengths to which the Assad regime is willing to go to in order to win the civil war. The Assad 
regime has used chemical weapons against its own people and shown no regret or sympathy 
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toward the hundreds of thousands of people, many of them civilians, killed in the civil war, nor 
the millions of refugees forced to flee domestically or internationally.   
 The other two important forces in the war are IS itself, and the various other rebel groups.  
IS is not related to Assad or the Syrian civil war; it is an organization with its own aims and 
goals that seized upon the civil war to take territory in Syria. With Assad and the other military 
groups engaged in chaotic fighting, IS succeeded in taking large swaths of land. IS did not 
change the nature of the Syrian civil war necessarily, though it added another layer of conflict to 
the already complex situation. Some actors became involved in the war to battle IS, while others 
remained strictly interested in supporting or fighting against Assad, and others even were 
interested in both objectives simultaneously. Additionally, some actors such as Russia support 
Assad but channel resources toward fighting ISIS; others such as Israel are primarily interested 
in conflict with Iran and Hezbollah, two subgroups of the conflict, and not particularly interested 
in Assad or IS.   
It is also important to note that all of the various rebel groups are important actors in this 
conflict. They are numerous, splintered, and in search of very different objectives. It falls outside 
of the scope of this paper to discuss more actors than those main groups considered above, but it 
is important to note for a full understanding of the scenario that hundreds of separate rebel 
groups, some valuable in the fight against IS, and others involved in the proxy war, add to the 
quagmire of Syria.  
 In 2015, all of these actors were involved in varying ways in the conflict, and the civil 
war had come to a standstill.  In response to the stagnation, Russia carried out its first airstrikes 
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in the country, claiming to target IS, but actually targeting anti-Assad rebel groups.254 Late in the 
same year, and with thanks to the help of external actors, Assad’s forces started to regain 
territory, including the major population center of Homs.255 In 2016, bolstered by Russian 
airpower and Iranian assistance, Assad’s forces also regained control of Aleppo. During the same 
time period, Turkey increased on-the-ground involvement against IS, but also against Kurdish 
militia groups. Concurrent to Turkish operations against the YPG, the U.S. was channeling 
money and weapons to Kurdish militia groups, hoping they would aid the U.S. objective of 
vanquishing IS.256 In early 2017, President Donald Trump undertook his first action involving 
Syria, bombing an army base as a reprisal for chemical weapons attacks by Assad against 
opposition forces and civilians.257 Only a few months later, U.S.-backed YPG members, in 
concert with other opposition forces, began to make serious headway against IS fighters, and in 
the fall of 2017, IS was pushed out of its former stronghold at Raqqa.258 
 By July of 2018, Assad and his allies had recaptured most territory in the country, and by 
early 2019, Kurdish militias had forced IS out of their last stronghold in Syria. Trump announced 
intentions to remove U.S. troops from the country in response to this seeming defeat of IS in 
Syria, and he issued a series of threats to Turkey, offering penalties and retribution if Turkish 
forces continued to target Kurds.259 The last obstacle remaining between the Syrian government 
and victory is the city of Idlib, a stronghold for rebel groups, though mainly for Haya’t Tahrir al-
Sham (HTS), an al-Qaeda affiliate. An estimated three million civilians have taken shelter in the 
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city, most of them internally displaced citizens. Russia and Turkey reached the Sochi Agreement 
in September of 2018, to establish a demilitarized zone in and surrounding Idlib.  The agreement, 
“dictated that heavy weapons, tanks, rocket systems and mortars of all opposition groups would 
be withdrawn by October 10, and the zone [would] be monitored by coordinated Turkish and 
Russian patrols.”260 The aim of the agreement was that Turkey and Russia, and their allies would 
avoid military conflict in Idlib until Turkey could convince HTS rebels and other ‘radical’ 
groups to leave Idlib.261 The ultimate idea was that, once the main rebel groups had left the city, 
some other agreement could be reached that settled the offensive while attempting to mitigate 
devastation, particularly for civilians. Turkey was motivated to reach the Sochi Agreement out of 
fear that, should a full Russian-Syrian offensive occur, many of these civilians in Idlib would 
flee to Turkey. In reaching this agreement, however, Turkey did not say how it planned to 
convince radical groups to leave the city, and additionally did not even define exactly what it 
meant by ‘radical’ groups. Russia agreed to the demilitarized zone to avoid massive 
humanitarian fallout if possible. Ultimately, with Idlib standing as the last rebel stronghold in 
Syria, conflict in the city was inevitable but not pressing.    
 However, as foreseen when the agreement began in September of 2018, Turkey has made 
no appreciable progress in convincing radical rebel groups to vacate the city. There is simply no 
reason for rebel groups to do so, and Turkey does not have many tools at its disposal to force 
their departure. Over the following months, as nothing appeared to be happening, the 
international community became increasingly wary that the demilitarized zone was a stalling act, 
rather than a tangible step toward avoiding conflict in Idlib. Concurrently, in early 2019 on the 
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heels of Trump’s announcement that U.S. forces would be leaving Syria, Erdogan started calling 
for the creation of a safe zone. Trump announced via Twitter that U.S. troop withdrawal from 
Syria would include the creation of a safe zone. The tweet read, “starting the long overdue 
pullout from Syria while hitting the little remaining ISIS territorial caliphate hard, and from 
many directions. Will attack again from existing nearby base if it reforms. Will devastate 
Turkey economically if they hit Kurds. Create 20 mile safe zone... .”262  
Turkey wants a safe zone to protect its border from an influx of refugees should Idlib 
fall. Additionally, such a safe zone would ensure that Kurdish forces do not encroach upon 
Turkish territory following U.S. troop withdrawal and the eventual end of the conflict. It is, 
however, not clear why the U.S. wants a safe zone outside of obvious humanitarian concerns, 
though some reports suggest the safe zone would only be for Kurds.263 That notion raises 
additional concerns; namely, which Kurds would be allowed, and whether the current 
Kurdish regions would be encapsulated within it. It is also unclear why Trump believes that 
Kurds would choose to enter the safe zone instead of taking their chances fighting, given 
their military prowess and martial culture. Turkey has also suggested that the creation of a 
buffer zone or safe zone on Syria’s border with Turkey could create an opportunity to 
repatriate the Syrian refugees inside of Turkey.264  Turkey has also not clarified whether the 
proposed zone would be a safe zone or a buffer zone, as both phrases have been used.265  The 
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difference between a safe zone and a buffer zone is a vital concern for humanitarian, 
military, and political purposes. As opposed to a safe zone, a buffer zone is, as the U.S. 
military defines, “[an] area controlled by a peace operations force… formed to create an area of 
separation between disputing or belligerent forces and reduce the risk of renewed conflict.’”266  
A buffer zone is first and foremost a military undertaking, whereas a safe zone is a humanitarian 
tool.    
 The U.S. and Turkey are in contact regarding the creation of a safe zone, but the 
actors have not reached any conclusions. U.S. Syria envoy James Jeffrey (a position 
officially entitled the Secretary’s Special Representative for Syria Engagement) is set to travel 
to Turkey, “soon… to try to iron out the details of its safe-zone proposal.”267  Turkey 
demands involvement in the control of whatever zone is implemented and refuses to allow 
Kurds to enter it. 268 Accordingly, Erdogan has even threatened that Turkey can undertake the 
safe zone by itself if needed.269 So far, the U.S. has refused to cut ties with the YPG but is 
reluctant to agree to a safe zone that does not allow YPG members inside of it.270 The U.S. is 
wavering in its commitment to Kurdish forces, as the relationship between the two actors was 
built mainly on fighting IS, a force which is at least momentarily subdued. The U.S. 
additionally has no interest in staying in the conflict, which would mean the U.S. would not 
play a large role in implementing the safe area. To remedy this problem, the U.S. has tried to 
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convince European nations to send troops to undertake the safe zone. It is unclear whether 
Trump means for the safe area to be undertaken in concert with Turkey, or independent from 
the nation, though it also is not particularly important, as European nations have thus far 
refused to send troops.271  
Jeffrey said, “in terms of the Kurds, what we’re working with is with Turkey to have a 
safe zone of some length along the Turkish border where there would be no YPG forces, because 
Turkey feels very nervous about the YPG and their ties to the PKK.”272  Jeffrey later added, “We 
also do not want anyone mishandling our SDF partners, some of whom are Kurds. And so 
therefore, we’re working for a solution that will meet everybody’s needs.” Notably, Russia 
argues that any safe zone would need to be approved by Assad.273 A Russian spokesperson 
asserted, “The question of the presence of a military contingent acting on the authority of a third 
country on the territory of a sovereign country and especially Syria must be decided directly by 
Damascus.”274 The Syrian government opposes the creation of safe zones by another actor, citing 
sovereignty and unity concerns.275  
In the meantime, while the U.S. and Turkey have been fighting over a proposed safe zone 
that appears to revolve around the Kurds and Turkish interest, the situation in Idlib has 
deteriorated greatly. Turkey was unable to convince any of the radical rebel groups to leave the 
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city, and Russian and Syrian patience has worn thin.  Beginning in early April, Russian and 
Syrian forces began shelling Idlib.276 By mid-April, the shelling had not yet risen to the level of 
full conflict, but the resumption of violence is concerning.277 It appears to only be a matter of 
time until the full battle for Idlib begins. In the meantime, not much has been done to improve 
the situation for the civilians taking refuge in the city.  
Analysis 
The safe zone, as proposed, would help Turkey protect its border from Kurds and oust 
Kurds from their current territory in Syria. It would also create a buffer zone between 
Turkey’s border and possible refugee outflows from Idlib, and additionally allow Turkey to 
repatriate the roughly four million Syrian refugees currently in Turkey. The safe zone could 
also fulfill the European objective of stemming refugee flows, though Europe has thus far 
been unwilling to play a role in the action. President Trump supports the creation of a safe 
area, but not under Turkey’s parameters. The U.S. does not want to accept a safe area that 
rejects Kurds and additionally does not want to agree to leaving Turkey with sole 
enforcement power for the area of security. It is also unclear what President Trump intends to 
accomplish with the safe zone. He could mean for the safe zone to be solely for Kurds to 
ensure their safety after U.S. troop withdrawal for counterterrorism purposes. President 
Trump could also intend to protect Syrian civilians in concert with Kurds, to save face 
following the U.S.’s exit from the conflict. Trump’s motivations remain opaque, possibly 
because the administration does not actually have goals for the policy, or at least does not 
have goals yet, and questions linger.  
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 The interests of other actors in the conflict complicate, rather than illuminate, these 
questions. Russia maintains that Syria has to approve of any Turkish safe zone,  namely 
because of the consequences Turkish control of Syrian territory could have. The Syrian 
government remains opposed to this idea. It is a slippery slope to allow the Turkish 
government to place ground troops in a section of Syrian territory, even if Turkish 
motivations seem to involve the Kurds and not Assad’s regime. None of the other important 
actors in the conflict, mainly the rebel groups, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Israel, and Hezbollah, 
have commented on the creation of a safe zone in northeastern Turkey. The lack of input on 
the parts of these actors is, naturally, tied to their motivations and interests. The few 
remaining rebels (excluding the Kurds) are locked in a war with the Syrian government and 
its allies that the rebels are going to lose. The groups are focused mainly on these last battles; 
the territorial position of the Kurds is of no interest to other rebel groups, as the Kurds are 
not really battling Assad. Additionally, the rebel groups’ wishes regarding civilians and 
civilian safety are unclear. While rebel groups could have an interest in civilian safety, the 
groups could also view a civilian presence in conflict zones as a positive. Civilian presence 
buffers rebel groups, if marginally, from the Syrian government and its allies. This 
observation is clear in the Russian and Turkish implementation of the demilitarized zone at 
Idlib. The large civilian presence in the city, in concert with other considerations, bought the 
rebel groups a significant amount of time. At the very least, the rebel groups have larger 
concerns than the immediate implementation of the safe zone, and how it would or would not 
affect Kurds and civilians.  
 Iran and Hezbollah, for their parts, are in the conflict solely to support Assad and 
project power both as actors and as Shia entities. They have succeeded so far and stand to 
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ultimately win the conflict as soon as Idlib falls. In simple terms: Iran and Hezbollah have 
already won everything they set out to fight for. There is no reason for either group to 
expand their involvement into the questions of safe zones, Kurds, and civilians. Both actors 
could have an interest in helping Assad combat Kurdish forces should they retain Syrian 
territory following the war, however, there is not an avenue currently available for either Iran 
or Hezbollah to pursue those goals. Countering the Kurds in Syria at this moment in time 
would mean supporting Sunni Turkey. Similarly, Saudi Arabia has no particular interest in 
the Kurds or civilians, either in Idlib or repatriated to Syria. Saudi Arabia is an opposition 
supporter for both religious and political reasons, but has clearly accepted Assad winning the 
war. This is clear through a lack of increased Saudi military involvement aimed to counter 
the Syrian government’s slow march to victory. Saudi Arabia both has no interest in 
addressing the safe zone problem and also stands to gain nothing from it. This consideration 
of the interests of actors in the conflict further highlights that the main players in question 
are Kurdish militias, Turkey, the U.S., and the Syrian government and Russia more 
peripherally.   
 Notably, the only Kurdish interest is retaining territory in Syria following the war. 
Erdogan’s obsession with the Kurds is entirely self-serving. He has manufactured a Kurdish 
threat to bolster his political power and popularity and to stoke Turkish nationalism. It 
should also be clarified that the Kurds are not passive actors in these considerations. They 
are an organized group with numerous, powerful militias who have been battling IS in Syria 
for years. Additionally, many Kurdish militias are well-armed with American weapons. The 
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YPG, and its partner militia, the all-female YPJ, had roughly 60,000 soldiers in 2017.278 For 
reference, U.S. troop deployment peaked at 100,000 in Afghanistan, a significantly larger 
area than the Kurdish-controlled northeastern corner of Syria.279 These observations 
complicate the idea that the U.S. would need a safe zone to protect Kurds from Turkey; even 
if the safe zone was comprised of only Kurdish civilians, why could they not just shelter 
behind Kurdish lines? Would the Kurds fight Turkish offensives in a different area than the 
safe zone? What if the safe zone is in the heart of Kurdish territory? Or fighting around the 
safe zone, but with international troops protecting a collection of Syrian Kurds in the middle 
of the fighting? Again, there are no answers available to these questions yet, but they are 
worth raising to gain a better understanding of the obstacles of the safe zone plan suggested 
by the U.S.   
Additionally, while Turkey has more military power than the Kurds, and could and 
would beat the Kurds in a conflict, it is unreasonable to expect that the Kurds would not put 
up a fight. If the Kurds fought against IS to regain their territory, it is very likely they would 
do the same against Turkish forces. There would very likely be a large-scale conflict between 
Kurdish and Turkish forces within Syria should Turkey co-opt Kurdish territory for a safe 
area. 
 It is also important to discuss how the interests of the actors involved informs 
willingness to overcome challenges in safe zone implementation. It is clear that Turkey’s 
interests are large and inform a large amount of will. The problem with Turkish will, 
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however, is that it has nothing to do with safe zones or humanitarian aims. It is unclear how 
Turkish will to battle the Kurds, and Turkey’s desire to push them out of their current 
territory, could translate into the creation of a properly implemented safe zone. Not only is 
the Turkish idea of countering the Kurds through the use of a safe zone built on flawed 
reasoning, but Turkish attempts to achieve a military objective through this safe zone would 
be problematic. It would be problematic because, as proposed, this safe area would protect 
four million repatriated Syrian civilians. The repatriated Syrians would presumably later be 
joined by whatever number of individuals can flee Idlib, or choose to do so once the fighting 
begins in earnest.  
Turkey has a vested interest in finding a way to remove destabilizing Syrian refugees 
from within its borders. This willingness would theoretically motivate Turkey to implement a 
successful safe zone so as to avoid Syrians fleeing back into Turkey. However, Turkey views 
the safe area first and foremost as a tactical tool in its war against the Kurds. Implementing 
the safe zone in Kurdish territory to force Kurds out of the border region will lead to full -
scale conflict between Turkish and Kurdish forces. This conflict is likely to revolve around 
the territory Turkey has taken from the Kurds; this territory is necessarily the safe zone. 
During this full-scale conflict, Turkish military interests will trump Turkish willingness to 
ensure the continued safety of the repatriated refugees.  
Essentially, Turkey’s current plan will put millions of innocent people at ground zero 
of a serious conflict between the Turkish government and Kurdish militias. Additionally, 
there is the compounding factor of Assad’s opposition to a safe area, and Russia’s steadfast 
support of the Syrian government. It cannot be known how Syria and Russia would respond 
to these Turkish actions. Ultimately, while much of this remains unknown, it is clear that 
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Turkey’s real goal is countering Kurdish power, and that attempting to achieve that goal 
through the avenue of a safe zone would not only be unsuccessful, but could also harm a 
large number of civilians.  
 The U.S. and the international community as a whole also face a moral hazard.  The 
U.S. has an interest in protecting the Kurds, though it is marginal for two reasons. First, the 
immediate threat that created the partnership, IS, has lessened greatly. The U.S. would 
theoretically have an interest in maintaining close ties with the Kurds to fight the possible 
reemergence of IS. However, given Trump’s announcement that IS has been, “one hundred 
percent defeated,” the likelihood of maintained U.S.-Kurdish relations for counterterrorism 
purposes is low.280 Second, the U.S. has a history of flip-flopping on support for Kurdish 
forces across the Middle East. While Kurds have been valuable partners for the U.S. in 
various scenarios, the U.S. has also historically had few qualms in abandoning Kurdish 
partnerships. A prominent example of such U.S. behavior has already been covered in the 
northern Iraq case study. The U.S. chose to continue arming Hussein’s regime with chemical 
weapons to use against Iran, despite the fact that (ignoring the illegality and immorality of 
chemical weapons) Hussein was also using those weapons to target U.S.-allied Kurdish 
forces and Kurdish civilians in northern Iraq. Through understanding that U.S. commitment 
to the Kurds is marginal, or at least easily abandoned, it becomes clear that the U.S.’s actual 
interest is in appearing to untangle itself responsibly from Syria. The U.S. wants to save face 
internationally after its proclamation of a hasty withdrawal. Trying to ensure that the Kurds 
are left in a good position achieves that goal. So does, however, supporting Turkey in the 
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creation of a safe zone. This analysis shows that the best way to actually protect the Kurds is 
to ensure Erdogan avoids targeting them. However, that is not the course of action the Trump 
administration has taken. While Trump’s original tweet suggesting a “20 mile safe zone…” 
also threatened economic repercussions for Turkish actions against the Kurds, the dialogue 
has since softened.281 With a physical meeting between Turkish and American officials 
forthcoming, the U.S. is maintaining opposition to some aspects of Erdogan’s current plan 
but has not pursued any methods to ensure Turkey does not undertake operations that would 
affect Kurdish populations. The U.S. has not issued serious threats, even in response to 
Erdogan’s proclamations that Turkey can and will implement its safe zone plan alone. 
Instead, Al-Monitor reports that Jeffrey, “is willing to consider a safe zone inside Syria on the 
Turkish border that would include a limited number of Turkish forces but that is free of the 
People’s Protection Units.”282 
 The fact that U.S. diplomats seem willing to work with Turkey to create a safe zone, 
even one that excludes Kurds, is evidence of the moral hazard problem in this scenario. The 
U.S., as discussed, has an interest to be appearing to do something to mitigate the negative 
effects of its withdrawal. This interest of appearing to do something could manifest in 
actually doing something, but if there is an opportunity to support another actor in its 
undertaking, the U.S. will likely choose to do so. Regardless of moral realities, supporting 
another actor will achieve the U.S.’s goal of appearing to take action, while avoiding the 
effort, risk, and money of actually implementing a policy. Ultimately, the U.S. and other 
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international actors are flirting with supporting Turkish actions even though they will, if 
executed, inevitably result in harm.  
 While all of these dynamics are playing out, the tenuous demilitarization agreement in 
Idlib is crumbling, and no actor has taken steps to address the crisis. Russia and Syria 
agreeing to the demilitarized zone in Idlib signals their willingness to at least come to the 
table for humanitarian negotiations. The international community could even pursue 
something as simple and low stakes as a humanitarian corridor. The actors involved in the 
conflict could agree to a few days where civilians could leave the city in safety. The 
international community would not even have to commit to giving anything to the civilians 
after they left the city. Simply offering them a safe way to flee would be a better option than 
any they currently have.  
 Ultimately, the framework set forth by the literature review of this paper, and the 
conclusions explored in each of the previous case studies, all point toward the question of 
safe zones failing in this scenario. Turkey’s interests in creating the safe zone are impure and 
should raise serious red flags as to future full-scale military conflict between Turkey and the 
Kurds, which would likely have massive humanitarian consequences. Additionally, the 
international community has not been, at large, appropriately wary of Turkey’s call for safe 
zones. The international community’s lack of caution is related to the moral hazard  Turkish 
actions would create. On their surface, these proposed actions could be understood to address 
the humanitarian crisis in Syria. Lastly, any moves by Turkey or the U.S. regarding a safe 
zone risk further inflaming conflict with Russia and Syria, and waste precious time and 
resources that could be channeled toward finding a way to save as many civilian lives in Idlib 
as possible.    
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Conclusion 
Safe zones are such an appealing tool; they conjure grand notions of returning civility 
to war zones. In a bleak world increasingly mired in conflict that harms innocent individuals, 
the concept of a knight in shining armor− whether it be an international organization, a 
multinational coalition, or a single actor− entering a conflict to return dignity and safety to 
vulnerable individuals has strong allure. Not only can this entity join the conflict with these 
pure, positive intentions in mind, but the actor can implement a simple safe zone, an area of 
security where individuals at risk can shelter and have adequate basic resources. The actor 
can achieve this without having any sort of larger effect on the conflict because the actor is, 
after all, impartial and neutral. The safe area remains a shining beacon of safety and civility, 
and all of the parties in the conflict avoid it out of humanitarian respect. Ultimately, this is a 
beautiful, compelling idea that plays on very real human heartstrings. Though most of the 
analysis in this paper is cynical about the intentions of actors and the outcomes of their 
undertakings, this paper is not cynical about the genuine empathy of most people. Faced with 
the surplus of violence and sadness in the world, most individuals feel genuine pain and 
genuine heartache. When these individuals read about safe zones in the newspaper, or hear 
politicians calling for safe zones in conflict areas they have seen covered in brutal news 
segments, it is natural to want them to be used and to be used widely. Safe zones, grounded 
in their very name, appear to offer a simple, positive solution to humanitarian crises.  
These are the very reasons safe zones need to be discussed. They sound so positive, 
and so many people with genuinely good intentions support them. However, they directly 
caused the death of 8,000 innocent boys and men in Srebrenica. The UN entered the war in 
Bosnia and established the safe zone at Srebrenica with only good intentions, but  it did not 
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understand the dangers of this chosen policy, and its actions gathered tens of thousands of 
innocent individuals into a physically vulnerable place. Safe zones, if the international 
community does not wake up to their dangers, could be the cause of humanitarian disaster for 
literally millions of Syrian refugees. It is important to understand this negative side of safe 
zones because the international community, in attempting to make conditions better for 
individuals experiencing extreme hardship and danger, can make their situations infinitely 
worse. Additionally, actors with bad intentions can easily use the existing system to pursue 
self-serving policies with negative humanitarian effects.  
 The four cases studied above validate the proposed framework as a useful tool for 
deconstructing humanitarian interventions, and the use of safe zones in particular.  The four 
very different cases can all be broken down to their components through a discussion of 
interest. Why specifically does an individual actor want to undertake an intervention?  The 
framework then considers will. Based on why an actor wants to undertake this intervention, 
what can be known about its willingness to mobilize troops? How willing is this actor to 
organize and execute the practical aspects of the mission? Based on this understanding of 
interest and willingness, the framework explores success. If the actor chooses intervention 
despite lacking appropriate interest and levels of willingness, what is the outcome? Lastly, 
when looking at all of these factors together, the framework discusses moral hazard. What 
role did moral hazard play in not only the decisions of the actor to intervene, but also in the 
decisions of the international community to support or not support the intervention?  
 It is clear in these cases that it is very unlikely that an actor possesses adequate 
interest to implement a safe zone successfully. It is impossible for an actor to have adequate 
willingness to overcome the challenges of the safe zone without a large interest in the 
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conflict. Without the willingness to overcome these challenges, the likelihood of the 
intervening force mobilizing and deploying an adequate force to actually undertake the safe 
zone is null. The cases of Srebrenica and Rwanda show how a lack of interest on the part of 
the intervenor informs a low willingness to address challenges. This low willingness 
inevitably manifests in an inadequate number of poorly armed troops. In both of these cases, 
the safe zones did not remain safe for all of the vulnerable individuals within them.  
On the other hand, the only case of a successfully implemented safe zone discussed 
was northern Iraq. Actors across the multinational coalition had adequate interest in 
intervention, which informed a willingness to address and overcome the challenges of the 
situation. The result was a robust, well-armed force creating and protecting an effective safe 
zone. However, as discussed, this willingness to overcome challenges was only great enough 
because the challenges in the case of northern Iraq were artificially low. These challenges 
were artificially low due to the fortuitous circumstances of the intervention. Additionally, 
while this analysis shows that successful safe zones are theoretically possible to undertake, 
that can only happen with high interest, high willingness, and the mobilization of appropriate 
means to overcome challenges. This could have been the case for the Turkish safe zone in 
Syria; Turkey has a very high national security and economic interest in repatriating Syrian 
refugees. That interest could have theoretically informed a willingness to undertake the safe 
zone correctly. However, Turkish calls for a safe zone are tied up in a military and political 
struggle against the Kurds, removing the possibility of creating a successful humanitarian 
space.  
 Despite this set of observations and facts, safe zones persist as a commonly called-for 
tool of humanitarian intervention because they create a moral hazard for various actors in 
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various ways. The international community views safe zones incorrectly to be a form of 
humanitarian intervention that requires less effort and commitment than other forms. This 
belief is grounded in the fact that most other forms of humanitarian or diplomatic 
intervention require addressing the root cause of a conflict, where safe zones can be a Band-
Aid on the conflict’s effects. However, as this analysis suggests, the lack of interest that led 
the actor to choose implementing a safe zone over other forms of intervention in the first 
place will inevitably manifest in the safe zone. Despite these facts and the brutal history of 
safe zones, the international community continues buying into safe zones because of this 
moral hazard. Cynically, actors ignore these objective truths because safe zones continue to 
offer them a way to intervene that is fairly cost-effective. If the actor has a greater interest in 
appearing to address a conflict than it does in actually addressing the conflict,  safe zones 
remain an attractive option. Less cynically, even in the face of all of this evidence, many 
international actors still believe that safe zones can work, and undertake them as a cost-
effective tool of intervention in good faith. Additionally, there is no incentive for other actors 
in the international community to vocally oppose an actor implementing a safe zone.  
Another actor intervening in a conflict, even one with bad intentions or obviously lacking 
adequate means, creates a moral hazard for the international community as a whole. If the 
international community supports the actor’s intervention, other actors in the international 
community are absolved of pressure to intervene themselves.  
 The application of this framework to these cases makes it clear that there are serious 
structural problems with safe zones. The first problem is that states and actors will 
essentially never have adequate interests and will to undertake humanitarian intervention 
responsibly and well. This argument is both the crux of this argument and the part of it that 
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differs most greatly from other considerations of safe zones. Humanitarian Intervention and 
Safety Zones: Iraq, Bosnia, and Rwanda by Carol McQueen has, for example, been a 
valuable source for this paper. McQueen’s own final conclusion, however, does not align 
with the conclusion reached through this research. She asserts that, “Safety zones seem more 
likely to succeed…if they are coherent in design; if they are implemented as a c lear interim 
measure by a single state or multinational force with clear rules of engagement; if they are 
integrated into a broader conflict resolution approach; and if they are buttressed by a 
sufficiently strong state willingness to enforce them so as to ensure a credible deterrent threat 
against possible retributive measures.”283 What McQueen does not recognize or acknowledge 
is that all of the aspects she notes for success in safe zone implementation before state 
willingness are products of state willingness. Without state willingness, none of the other 
aspects she marked as vital for a successful operation can be attained.   
Her analysis of state willingness itself is also flawed; she argues that “[safe zones] let 
states do something to protect civilians targeted for slaughter, but let them simultaneously 
avoid becoming embroiled in the military conflict underway.”284 McQueen’s argument is 
confused. Protecting the civilians targeted for slaughter is becoming embroiled in the 
military conflict underway. An intervening force inherently has to protect civilians from 
slaughter by another group. Not recognizing this dynamic sews the seed for safe zone failure. 
Entering a conflict without the willingness to become involved in the conflict, and without 
the willingness to physically protect the vulnerable group from the belligerent, will not 
succeed in protecting the vulnerable group from the belligerent.    
                                                 
283 McQueen, Intervention, 161. 
284 McQueen, Intervention, 151. 
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 The tension between McQueen’s conclusion and the conclusion of this paper  
illuminates the importance of having these discussions about safe zones. Well-informed and 
highly experienced individuals like Hillary Clinton call for safe zones, falling into the trap of 
thinking they are an easy fix for humanitarian crises. Or maybe some of those individuals 
calling for safe zones have a slightly more nuanced understanding of their history, perhaps 
they know about the massacre at Srebrenica, but they fall into McQueen’s camp. These 
educated individuals assert that safe zones can be successful if they are just done correctly, 
and that their historical failures were all due to inadequate or flawed implementation. The 
reality of safe zones, however, is that the structure of interest and willingness that need to be 
in place for success is unlikely to ever be fulfilled by an actor pursuing humanitarian 
intervention.   
 The longer the international community remains ignorant to these facts  or chooses to 
feign ignorance of these facts, the longer the most vulnerable individuals in conflict zones 
will be endangered by safe zone policy decisions. The case study of Syria makes this 
dynamic clear; instead of addressing the humanitarian crisis in Idlib, Turkey is attempting to 
institute a doomed safe zone purely in pursuit of domestic interests. The United States is 
playing into the plan to save face with the international community.  
 Ultimately, safe zones are an issue where a broader public understanding is easily 
achievable. While a broader public understanding is unlikely to change all of the problematic 
aspects of the international system that have allowed safe zones to be implemented for 
decades, making more individuals aware of the dangers of safe zones could create a culture 
of accountability where none currently exists. At the very least, increased public knowledge 
of these issues will pay witness to some of the ways in which the international community 
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has harmed vulnerable individuals in conflict zones. This outrage can push back against the 
notion of an international community more interested in the appearance of intervention than 
the actual humanitarian situation of civilians. Even in the face of inaction by the international 
community, this anger can be a testament to the many genuinely good people in the world 
who want to help those suffering the greatest.  
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